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Downsizing information systems from large and centralized mainframe computing
architectures to
smaller and distributed desktop systems is one of the most difficult and critical strategic
decisions facing both
corporate and government organizations. Vendor advertisements and media hype often boast
of huge cost savrngs
and greater flexibility while retaining mainframe-strength performance. Cryptic
terminology, biased vendor
assistance and rapidly changing technology complicate already difficult decisions. This
thesis provides an
executive summary for middle and top managers requiring a survey of the major downsizing issues. It
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ABSTRACT
Downsizing information systems from large and centralized mainframe computing
architectures to smaller and distributed desktop systems is one of the most difficult and
critical strategic decisions facing both corporate and government organizations. Vendor
advertisements and media hype often boast of huge cost savings and greater flexibility
while retaining mainframe-strength performance. Cryptic terminology, biased vendor
assistance, and rapidly changing technology complicate already difficult decisions. This
thesis provides an executive summary for middle and top managers requiring a survey of
the major downsizing issues. It provides an overview of architectural trends that are helping
to fuel the downsizing process to include an emphasis on the client/server paradigm, the
evolving roles of the mainframe and desktop computers, and innovative architectural
software tools. An analysis of management and technical risks according to organizational,
performance, and cost factors also focuses on such critical considerations as business
process reengineering, open systems, flexibility, throughput, security, conversion costs, and
life-cycle costs of downsized systems. Finally, this thesis "frames" the issues for the Office
of Naval Intelligence and DoD by highlighting and outlining some general guidelines that
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The purpose of this thesis is to provide mid-level and top-level managers at the Office
of Naval Intelligence (ONI) with a risk assessment and "state of the art" report on factors
associated with, and affecting, the key decision to "downsize" information systems. Most
often typified by the architectural transition from large, centralized mainframe systems to
a network of distributed workstations, the downsizing issue is currently one of the most dif-
ficult and critical strategic decisions facing both corporate and government organizations.
The decision to downsize is particularly important in light of the new budget constraints,
the reduction of personnel associated with the tighter budget, and resulting pressure to ac-
complish "more with less." Few would dispute the harkening of a new world era— the post-
industrial age ofinformation—where efficient collection, processing, and dissemination of
information is becoming a strategic necessity. This thesis is written as a consequence of
new technologies that have enabled better, faster, and cheaper options of processing that
information. These new innovations in technology have generated new methods of process-
ing information, new architectures. Those organizations that understand when, where, and
how to select the most advantageous of these architectures will better be able to meet their
budget, achieve maximum productivity from their personnel, and accomplish defined
goals. This thesis will try to provide some background, insight, and suggestions to the
"where, when, and how" of downsizing.
Though this thesis is written in response to research requirements prompted by mid-
level and top-level managers at ONI, significant portions this thesis are applicable to any
large-scale organization, government or corporate, with sizable investments in information
systems. The research conducted in the completion of this thesis primarily dealt with liter-
ature reviews and case studies associated with private business organizations. Undeniably,
however, there are lessons to be learned by DoD through the study of the corporate world.
After examination of the most widely relevant downsizing issues, the final segment of this
thesis will briefly "frame" the most pertinent issues for DoD organizations in general, and
ONI in particular.
B. BACKGROUND
This thesis is being written for the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) located in Suit-
land, Maryland. ONI is responsible for the collection, production, and dissemination of Na-
val-related intelligence information to satisfy the requirements of the Department of the
Navy (DoN), operating forces and commands, the research and development (R&D) com-
munity, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and
national command authorities and agencies.
In support of its mission, ONI manages a large array of naval intelligence automated
data processing systems that includes older technology mainframe computer systems.
These computer systems serve as hosts for extremely large databases supporting mission
areas such as scientific and technical data, worldwide merchant shipping, counternarcotics,
digital imagery, inter alia.
The current and future fiscal environment mandates that ONI initiate cost savings pro-
grams within the automated systems department, while ensuring these efforts do not ad-
versely impact the operational support mission of the command. These reductions include
cuts in system support hardware, software life-cycle support, and training costs. This situ-
ation is being exacerbated with increasing requirements such as new on-line databases as
part of the worldwide Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS)
Wide Area Network (WAN). Finally, in mid- 1994, ONI will be moving into a new
building—currently under construction—and wants to examine the issues of replacing
large mainframes with smaller workstation systems in the new environment without losing
functionality.
ONI submitted a proposal for a thesis research topic to the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) that suggested a risk analysis "on downsizing from large mainframe computer sys-
tems to high-end, client-server workstation as it applies to system performance, personnel
reductions, and system cost savings." One of ONI's proposed approaches was for NPS to
perform a systems-level risk analysis based upon a case study of a major commercial firm,
such as Mobil Oil or the IBM Credit Union, which downsized from larger mainframe com-
puter systems to high-end, client/server workstations. ONI made it clear that a case study
was only a suggested approach and left it to researcher discretion to determine the most ap-
propriate manner to address the pertinent downsizing issues. As already hinted in the pre-
vious section and outlined in the next section, it was ultimately determined that an
academic overview and survey of the most relevant downsizing issues would better suit
ONI and DoD needs than a focus on one particular case study.
ONI's proposed research suggested focusing on lessons learned in the downsizing
process including technical systems performance problems, cost savings, and management
issues. ONI was also interested in how new technologies could be inserted into their infor-
mation systems to help reduce the risk factors in downsizing the automated data processing
systems, while simultaneously optimizing system functionality, manpower reduction trade-
offs, and system hardware and software maintenance costs.
A visit was made to ONI to ascertain the scope of the downsizing envisioned and to
enable tailoring of the research for use by the command. During the visit, the thesis spon-
sors emphasized that they would like the research to focus not on the command itself, but
other corporate models. They did not want an "answer" on how ONI should, in detail,
downsize. They believed that with an understanding and appreciation of ONI's size and
complexity, appropriate case studies and an academic approach would best serve their
purposes.
ONI's intention is to stay abreast of fast moving technology and to meet growing cus-
tomer demands and requirements. The command is investigating new options, new tech-
nology, and new opportunities. The most appealing option that ONI is investigating is
downsizing to a client/server environment with high-end performance workstations. If the
command can increase mission effectiveness and save money through such an option then
it will further pursue that objective.
C. THESIS SCOPE AND OUTLINE
The thrust of this thesis will be a survey of the trends, concepts, methodologies, and
management strategies associated with the downsizing process. Because the issues related
to downsizing involve both management and technological issues, each dependent on the
other, this paper will address both management and technical perspectives.
The downsizing momentum has been fed by these two equally significant forces. On
one hand, technology has been driving managers to re-think they way their organizations
handle information. It has required top managers to streamline and re-engineer their busi-
ness processes in order to capitalize on new technological opportunities. On the other hand,
pressures to do "more with less" and subsequent implementations of new management
schemes (e.g., Total Quality Leadership (TQL) and Business Process Reengineering
(BPR)) have forced managers to consider how technology might assist them in coping with
new management initiatives. The downsizing of the corporate structure is directly linked to
the downsizing of information systems. As corporations aim to streamline their organiza-
tion and personnel, they look to technology for solutions. Thus, neither the management or
technical aspects of downsizing information systems should be considered without giving
attention to the other; the two are inextricably linked. This thesis will reflect that
relationship.
Before outlining the specific topics of discussion in this thesis, it is important to put
a bound on this obviously broad topic in which many sub-topics, by themselves, could eas-
ily be addressed in separate theses. This thesis has an ambitious objective in that any of the
subsequent chapters have been tackled by many different authors in many volumes of
books and other publications. Here, I point out that this thesis will be a broad-brush survey
of the downsizing issues, not unlike an executive "white paper" typical of larger organiza-
tions. This thesis will identify the major issues related to downsizing without delving into
too much detail. It will provide a comprehensive analysis of both management and techni-
cal issues, putting them in context with trends in computing. Most importantly, this thesis
will "frame" the downsizing trend, not offering any one solution, but offering ways of
thinking about downsizing and methods of approaching it in the context of one's own
organization.
Downsizing information systems can regarded as an inevitable result of evolving,
more capable technology. Simply put, the evolution of computing technology from the
mainframe in the "glass house" to the personal computer on the desktop has created a rev-
olution. This "revolution in computing" has generated new ways of thinking about infor-
mation technology as an integral part of an organization's strategy. The advent of desktop
computing has enabled managers to think of new ways that IT can help an organization ob-
tain its objectives. Top managers have been used to thinking about computing within a spe-
cific "mold" or context. Now, new technology has created an environment for a new way
of thinking about computing.
The second chapter in this thesis (the first chapter being this introduction) encapsu-
lates this new way of thinking, or "paradigm shift." This chapter first sets the stage by de-
scribing the changing business environment and the accompanying mandate for change. It
describes how IT has become closely linked with strategy, and how IS architectures are tied
to those strategies. Finally, it summarizes the shift from traditional mainframe computing
to desktop computing and the resulting trend of downsizing.
The third chapter will provide an overview of architectural decisions related to the
downsizing process. This will include a focus on establishing the appropriate architecture
with emphasis on the client/server model, and the evolving role of the mainframe, mini-
computer, and microcomputer within that architecture. The last part of this chapter will out-
line the various architectural tools and architectural trends that have helped fuel the
downsizing movement and have helped change the way organizations view computing.
The fourth chapter in this thesis discusses risk analysis issues and factors that must be
considered in the decision making process of whether or not to downsize. The chapter in-
volves a discussion of both qualitative and quantitative issues. First, it is imperative to look
at the organization as a whole and to define IT's role within it. IT-related processes need to
be examined and evaluated in conjunction with the organizational goals. Here, a brief over-
view of some of the new management initiatives will be conducted. Next, this chapter shifts
from an organizational aspect of risk analysis to an examination of performance factors.
Again, in discussing performance-related considerations, the discussion will survey a wide
gamut of issues from speed to security to maintenance of systems. Finally, in the last part
of the chapter, I will discuss methods of cost-justifying downsizing. This will entail both
quantitative and qualitative evaluations.
The final chapter will "frame" and summarize the key downsizing issues relative to
DoD and ONI requirements. This will include a discussion of how the corporate environ-
ment downsizing considerations may differ from those of the military. Corporate "lessons
learned" will be extracted and highlighted to give top managers some general guidelines
from which they can intelligently plan strategy and make key decisions. Undoubtedly, the
downsizing process has the potential to be an unstructured and haphazard exercise in
frustration that can lead to huge cost over-runs and even IS failures. Hopefully, this final
chapter will highlight the most applicable issues and provide a structured guideline to a
complex and seemingly overwhelming process.
II. THE PARADIGM SHIFT
A. THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
Change is the only constant. This phrase is as applicable to the information systems
world as it is to the current political and economic climate. Increased global competition,
the need for global management, reduced product cycles, changing demographics, and the
growing power of knowledge are all key forces driving escalating demands on information
systems. The world is changing at a pace perhaps more rapid than ever before. What impli-
cations does this hold for informations systems level in both the Department of Defense and
the corporate world? In this information age where knowledge means power, it translates
into a need for information systems that are capable of handling huge volumes of data
quickly, globally, securely, flexibly, and efficiently. In this post-industrial era, the new com-
modity is information. Those corporations, organizations, or even nations for that matter,
that are capable of collecting, analyzing, and responding to new information will, in short,
dominate the world stage.
B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AS STRATEGIC ASSET
Presuming acceptance of the value and power of information, one readily sees the ne-
cessity of incorporating IT into a corporate or organizational strategy. IT is the engine of
change that will propel some organizations into the future, while leaving others with less
foresight to wither away in obsolescence. IT is the enabling force that permits the handling
of collection, analysis, and intelligent responses to large volumes of information. Incre-
mental differences in the capabilities and flexibility of those "engines" will clearly separate
the winners from the losers. Thus, recognition of IT as a strategic asset and incorporating
it as a core element into an organization's strategy is a first step in securing a foothold in
this globally competitive market.
IT's strategic role can be categorized within three specific areas:
• as competitive tools
• to reengineer business processes
• for interorganizational linkage [Ref. l:p. 69]
1. IT as a Competitive Tool and Strategic Necessity
Other factors being equal, information strategists readily recognize effective cor-
porate implementation of IT as a competitive tool that is quickly becoming a strategic ne-
cessity. Organizations are realizing that if they fail to properly capitalize on this resource,
they will simply not stay in business. William Davidow and Michael S. Malone, authors of
The Virtual Corporation, acknowledge information processing as the "most important
power source of our generation" in structuring and revitalizing the corporation for the 21st
century |Ref. 2:p. 2]. At the corporate level, the authors state that "in the years to come,
incremental differences in companies' abilities to acquire, distribute, store, analyze, and in-
voke actions based on information will determine the winners and losers in the battle for
customers" [Ref. 2:p. 50].
In general, market dynamics do not permit organizations to maintain a competi-
tive advantage with IT. Under unique circumstances, a competitive advantage can be sus-
tained long enough that it can become a strategic advantage. Davidow and Malone provide
such an example. Extending the argument beyond the corporate level to the military and
illustrate, they illustrate the undeniable power of information in the Persian Gulf War:
Why the rout? The answer was obvious to anyone watching television during the
brief course of the war. The Allied troops had information on the Iraqis far superior
to any information held by their enemy and then managed that information more ef-
fectively. In strategic command and control, the Allies used satellite and reconnais-
sance information to learn just about everything they needed to know about Iraq's
static defenses. Tomahawk cruise missiles, using reconnaissance information stored
in their memories, were so well programmed that they actually followed roads and
streets to their targets. Further, because the Allies appreciated the importance of
information, they also knew the value of denying it to the other side.... With the Per-
sian Gulf War, the value of information reached a zenith—bytes became more im-
portant than bullets. The case was made, with brutal clarity, that information could
become the foundation for devastating destruction. [Ref. 2:p. 51]
Though this example may take the notion of strategic advantage to an extreme, it
effectively illustrates the information systems role as a force multiplier for both business
and defense applications and as a critical component in formulation of strategy.
2. Using IT to Reengineer Business Processes
Incorporation of IT into an organization's mission will not guarantee organiza-
tional success; technology, by itself, is not a panacea. A new IS may speed up an organiza-
tions^ processes, but if the organization's processes are already broken, automation of
those processes will only result in nominal improvements. IS managers should not rush out
and assume that throwing technology at a problem will secure a competitive advantage.
Although the emphasis in the 1980s was on using IT for competitive advantage, the
thrust in the early 1990s has turned inward, specifically to using IT as a catalyst to
'reengineer' outmoded business practices... mean(ing) fundamentally redesigning
how the enterprise works—its procedures, control mechanisms, reporting relation-
ships, decision makers, compensation criteria, and so forth—and generally making
IT an integral part of operations. The goal is to rid the firm of ways of working that
were appropriate for the paper-based world, and replace them with work modes that
leverage the attributes of IT. [Ref. 1 :p. K2]
Prior to utilization of any new architecture, the business processes must be exam-
ined. Business process re-engineering, according to IT consultant Michael Hammer—one
of the gurus of business process reengineering—is about:
... scrapping every belief, every method, every process—and then rebuilding the or-
ganization in entirely new ways... Simply put, information technology is absolutely
essential to re-engineering. It is the single most powerful tool for breaking traditional
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assumptions and rules, and the thing that makes new ways of operating possible.
[Ref. 3:p. 11-12]
Recognition that competitive advantage can be gained through the use of technol-
ogy is a preliminary step—but realization that a significant improvement in performance
can be achieved only through an organization's reengineering of its business processes is
essential. An organization needs to break down its functions, determine the value-added
processes, and streamline the organization accordingly.
3. Using IT for Interorganizational Linkage
IT's third strategic role is inherent in its ability to provide automated communi-
cation mechanisms with other departments or organizations. With the globalization of the
world economy, the need for interoganizational linkage is quickly growing. From the forg-
ing of strategic alliances to the maintenance of corporate accounting, the interchange of
electronic data can allow organizations to maintain critical partnerships without the con-
straints of space and time. This flexibility is particularly significant for today's corporation
that needs to be increasingly cognizant of and responsive to changing market trends and
customer demands. The "virtual product" described in Davidow's and Malone's virtual
corporation of the 21st century is the embodiment of the ideal:
A virtual product (the term is used to mean both physical products and services)
mostly exists even before it is produced. Its concept, design, and manufacture are
stored in the minds of cooperating teams, in computers, and in flexible production
lines... What these products and services have in common is that they deliver instant
customer gratification in a cost-effective way. They frequently can be produced in
diverse locations and offered in a great number of models or format... The ideal vir-
tual product or service is one that is produced instantaneously and customized in re-
sponse to consumer demand. [Ref. 2: p. 4]
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), the business-to-business computer exchange
of common business transactions, is one example of interorganizational linkage that has be-
come pervasive throughout many different industries. The topic of interorganizational
u
linkages is a thesis topic in itself; nevertheless, this aspect of IT undeniably warrants con-
sideration as a critical component of an organizations' s overall strategy.
C. THE CHANGING INFRASTRUCTURE
The previous section outlined three significant roles that IT can have in an organiza-
tion's overall strategy. Now the goal of top managers must be to try define the IS architec-
ture and its infrastructure that will enable their organizations to implement those strategies.
The IS architecture is the means to the end. To a large degree, the molding of the IS archi-
tecture to the organizational strategy—thereby obtaining the "best fit"—will determine the
degree of the strategy's success.
For large organizations dependent on mission-critical applications, the traditionally
appropriate IS architecture has been the centralized architecture built around the capabili-
ties of the mainframe. Until recently, for some corporations, the mainframe has been the
only feasible solution to meeting performance requirements. The increased processing ca-
pability of the desktop computer and the advent of networking technology has increased
the range of architectural options. The desktop revolution has unwrapped, to a degree, a
mentality that has been fixated around the mainframe. This next section takes a look at these
evolving performance trends—a discussion of traditional mainframe computing, the ad-
vance of desktop computing, and the resultant downsizing "paradigm shift."
1. Mainframe Computing
Mainframe computing has been the traditional computing architecture during the
past three decades—the term mainframe being coined back in the early '60s with reference
to the large and bulky metal cabinets where the central processing units (CPUs) were
stored. The mainframe has essentially dominated the state of computing architectures since
the development of the first digital computer (ENIAC) in the mid 1 940s and the successful
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commercialization of the UNIVAC in the 1950s. It has been the "mold" that shaped the
architectural paradigm for three decades. Companies have structured their processes
around the mainframe, aware of both its overall strategic importance of computing power
and the criticality of efficient information processing. Typically, the mainframes have host-
ed mission-critical applications, without which the organization could not continue to op-
erate. Evolving from almost strictly scientific applications and batch processing to wide-
ranging business functions and on-line transaction processing (OLTP), the mainframe has
helped organizations collect and store increasingly voluminous amounts of data, process
complex transactions quickly and effectively, and analyze and assimilate the resulting
flood of data.
Though the mainframe has been characterized as the backbone of the computing
industry and will surely continue to play a major role in the future of the computing indus-
try, every major strength of the mainframe seems to inevitably result in a countering weak-
ness. The impressive sophistication of mission-critical applications that meets all needs for
all users, for example, is not only extremely expensive to develop, but typically frustrating-
ly expensive and difficult to maintain. Compared to the new opportunities available on
emerging alternatives, the significant strengths of the mainframe are becoming less
attractive.
a. Major Shifts in Computing Requirements
The nature and role of today's mainframe has been set by a historical prece-
dent. Until the 1970s, there was no real alternative to mainframe computing; large-scale
computing was the only feasible solution to computing problems. Additionally, the hard-
ware at the time was extremely expensive and software was relatively cheap. Almost all
applications were developed to run in the batch-mode. On-line transaction processing was
still in its infancy. The relative simplicity of core applications processed in the batch-mode
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translated into relatively high productivity and throughput and resulted in respectable cost
savings.
Dan Trimmer, author of Downsizing: Strategies for Success in the Modern
Computer World, suggests that the today's business requirements have changed since the
1970s. He further states that the design precedents that have typified mainframe computers
have handicapped their ability to meet the new demands. He categorizes those changing
business requirements by three major shifts:
(1) Transition to an Interactive, On-Line Environment. Batch-mode pro-
cessing does not meet the needs and requirements of today's end-user. With the exception
of back-ups and maintenance of files, on-line transaction processing has become the norm
for many organizations.
(2) New Variety in the Applications Spectrum. Requirements for applica-
tions have become much more complex than before. In addition to the core applications,
end-users are demanding error-handling and unanticipated decision support capabilities to
serve management demands.
(3) Sophistication of End-users. End users have become much more com-
puter literate in the last two decades and are demanding more of their systems.
[Ref. 4:p. 35]
b. Costly and Complicated Hardware and Software
Concerns regarding cost are probably the primary motivating factors that
stimulate criticisms about the mainframe computer. Not unrelated to the high costs are mis-
givings about the associated complexity of related software. One underlying reason
—
linked to its historical precedent—is that the mainframe has attempted to be all things to all
people.
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(1) Hardware Costs. Because of the complex designs and low-volume
manufacturing (in a declining market) of mainframe computers, the high hardware costs are
one of its most distinguishing features.
Table 1: 3090 PROCESSOR PURCHASE PRICES [Ref 5]








As shown by Table l's purchase prices of IBM 3090 processors, the main-
frame costs pale next to mini and microcomputers in a cost comparison—despite advancing
technology and falling prices of central processors and solid state memory. Not only does
the complexity of the hardware elevate these high prices of central processors to this $2
million to $22 million range (in early 1990 figures), but also the combined need for pre-
sales support and extensive marketing.
(2) Hardware Complexity. Due to industry attempts to serve all needs of all
customers combined with the establishment of early standards, the hardware on the main-
frame is not only extremely expensive, but also very complex. Elaborate input/output sys-
tems and complicated processor and processor-to-memory relationships exacerbate the
15
situation. Author Dan Trimmer refers to this development as the "over-engineered main-













Elaborate Input/( )utput System
-X-
Complicated Processor and Processor-
To-Memory Relationships
Figure l:The "Over-engineered Mainframe" [Ref. 4:p. 39]
(3) Software Costs. Software packages developed for mainframes, like the
mainframe hardware itself, tend to be very expensive. Unlike software for personal com-
puters, mainframe software is developed by relatively few companies—resulting in less
competition and higher prices. Furthermore, mainframe software developers simply are un-
able to distribute their high fixed costs of software development to the same large market
share that the desktop computer enjoys. Those few corporations that purchase a common
mainframe software package must absorb the high fixed costs among themselves (the vari-
able costs of software development are relatively insignificant compared to the fixed costs).
Also, because mainframe software is often custom developed for an organization, analysis
of user requirements becomes critical and software must be tailored to meet specific needs.
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This process is time consuming and costly. If requirements are not properly defined, how-
ever, the costs grow even larger.
In the personal computer market, the fixed costs of developing less sophisti-
cated packaged software are simply not as high as those of the mainframe. Along with low-
er fixed costs and relatively insignificant variable costs, desktop software developers have
the additional advantage of potentially exploiting a huge market base. This economic situ-
ation combined with the intense competition among personal computer software develop-
ers both serve to keep the price of desktop software very low.
(4) Software Complexity. The alphabet soup of software related to the core
functionality of the various mainframes has proved to be detrimental to its continuing suc-
cess. The common perception is that of incompatibility and proprietorship among the var-
ious systems. Table 2's outline of the various operating systems, transaction monitors,
databases, and program generators common to large and small mainframes illustrates the
problem.


















As a result of this layering of diverse software among different types of main-
frame systems, inevitable incompatibilities occur that ultimately affect functionality, per-
formance, and costs. Attempts to overcome design shortfalls or compatibility problems
often calls for introduction of conversion programs or software patches. Disregarding the
maintenance nightmare that these supplementary "band-aids" cause, the mainframe soft-
ware ultimately becomes corrupted by fragmentation—with a resulting higher overhead
and greater inflexibility.
c. The Widening Gap
The three major shifts in the computing environment and the high costs and
labyrinthine complexity of the mainframe computing environment are not the only per-
ceived weaknesses of this fading monolith. As the mainframe remains plagued by its own
problems, advances in the personal computer market has produced trends that the broad
market has found quite appealing. Certainly, the demand has increased for "user-friendli-
ness," graphical user interfaces (GUIs), object-oriented programming (OOP), fourth-gen-
eration language (4GLs), and open systems. The personal computer market, amid intense
competition, has promptly responded to the call. Though the mainframe software develop-
ers have promised to deliver equivalent or better products in many cases, the evolution of
those products has been too slow to suit the taste of the demanding user. Thus, as shown in
Figure 2, the gap between the mainframe and popular alternatives grows wider.
The Gartner Group, a highly rated IS consulting firm, attributes the widening
gap to the following:
• Traditional mainframes are too expensive. S/390 is the target for open systems,
Unix, PCs and other challengers because it is expensive compared to alternatives
and yet it still commands a significant share of the market.









• Increasing Manpower Costs
• Low Quality of Solutions
• Limited Functionality
Figure 2: The Widening (iap (Ref. 4:p. 35)
• The pace of MVS software evolution has been slow. GUIs, object-oriented pro-
gramming, network processing, including client/server, were deployed earlier on
non-MVS platforms. [Ref. 7:p. 10-1 1
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d. The Mainframe Bureaucracy
Best typified by the image of the "white coated men behind glass doors," the
traditional mainframe's presence is usually accompanied by excessive bureaucratic bag-
gage that all too often exacerbates inefficiencies and wasteful administrative overhead. Un-
fortunately, with all of its inherent complexity in the software and hardware, this team of
"experts" is not uncalled for. Organizations have come to accept this bureaucratic burden
as a necessary evil to ensure task accomplishment. The complexity of both the hardware
and software (illustrated earlier) warrants system specialists with narrowly defined job re-
sponsibilities. One expert familiar with the costs of the personnel states:
...the human costs of running the mainframe are as high as its other costs. And de-
spite the high expenditure on what tries to present itself as a 'luxury' product, one is
still faced with inflexibility. The human bureaucracy in the large mainframe instal-
lation actually adds to the rigidity inherent in the underlying system. [Ref. 4:p. 42]
The isolation of the MIS department behind the glass house contributes to an
environment that makes it easy for computer specialists to be insulated from real-world
business requirements and unresponsive to end-users. Because of this and already
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backlogged application development and maintenance, new systems requirements often are
not met. With the desktop technological advances, new development tools available, and
the higher end-user experience levels, the gap between the mainframe and PC appears to
be widening. The market demand is for GUIs, 4GLs, and OOP among other things, where
the desktop often exceeds the mainframe in capabilities. Organizations are realizing that the
mainframe bureaucracy is costly in more than one way. Not only are the costs of maintain-
ing existing mainframe hardware and software high, but the opportunity costs of not ad-
vancing with current software trends are equally significant.
2. Evolutionary Changes Through Desktop Computing
Though the mainframe computer has been the traditional computing architecture
of the past, the desktop revolution is charting a new course for the future of computing. The
rapid changes and availabilities of opportunities is not only overwhelming, but also confus-
ing. Nonetheless, the new-found power currently available on the desktop has created a
technological momentum and an array of architectural options that is mind boggling. Un-
deniably, the trend has taken over the industry and is changing the way organizations are
coping with their methods of processing information. This section will analyze the charac-
teristics of the desktop computer that have spurred this revolutionary change, and will ex-
plore the evolutionary IS architectural options and trends that have resulted from it.
a. Defining the Desktop Computer
With the move towards desktop computing, it is important to define some re-
lated terminology a little more explicitly for the sake of clarity. When referring to desktop
computing, this term refers inclusively to personal computers (PCs) and what are common-
ly called workstations. Workstations usually have a true multitasking operating system, and
are accompanied by high resolution display cards and monitors and a math coprocessor.
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Workstations have also been the machine of choice when it comes to scientific-
applications. In contrast, PCs have commonly been the choice for business purposes.
Though these two classes of computers are quickly merging together and the differences
inevitably are blurred, Figure 3 illustrates a distinction that Gartner Group makes that may
be helpful in clarifying ambiguous definitions and for understanding the differences (subtle
and changing as they may be) between the PC and the workstation.
Personal Computers
• Limited capacity and performance
relative to workstations
• Intel CPU
• PC LAN/NOS work group
connectivity
• Primarily DOS, Windows, Mac,
or OS/2; NT emerging
• Primarily indirect sales
Workstations
• Highly scalable in capacity and
performance
• Primarily RISC CPU
• High-level peer connectivity and
enterprise integration
• Primarily a Unix environment
• Primarily direct sales
Figure 3: Differences between the PC and Workstation [Ret. 8:p. 1]
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b. Perceived Advantages with the Desktop
The pace of change in desktop computers has been staggering: within the past
decade microcomputers have advanced their lot from being hobbyists' toys to become the
centerpiece of computing. New and more powerful PC hardware and operating systems are
promising and delivering performance characteristics, security features, and multiprocess-
ing capabilities that have most often been associated with minicomputers and mainframes.
Besides rivaling performance features of more traditional systems, desktop computers are
also offering four key attributes often not found with their larger counterparts: cost savings,
desktop control, technological flexibility, and responsiveness to business changes
[Ref. 9:p. 11].
(1 .) Cost Savings. Without a doubt, cost savings is the biggest driving force
behind the desktop revolution. The many suppliers and the resulting economies of scale
have produced an intensely competitive market with attractive promises of cost savings that
have been irresistible to both small and large businesses. One aspect of cost justification
has always been to compare and analyze the hardware's price-to-performance ratios. For
example, the price per MIPS—as discussed later, not the best basis for comparison—on an
IBM 3090-600 mainframe has been quoted at $130,000; at the desktop level, the price per
MIPS on the RS/6000, IBM's RISC workstation, is roughly $500 [Ref. 6:p. 4].
Beyond this, the desktop computer market offers organizations cost savings
in many other areas. From software development to software maintenance, desktop com-
puting offers not only potentially huge savings, but also a greater variety of options. In
terms of scalablity, instead of risking huge corporate investments in untested mainframe
projects, organizations may buy only as much computing power as they currently need.
Through the use of distributed networks, organizations can modularly add to their infra-
structure as requirements dictate.This added benefit manifests itself both when
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organizations have limited funds to invest in start-up IS projects and when systems grow
older and need to be replaced by more capable technology. The architectural options pro-
vided by networking and the creation of distributed systems allow for the computing sys-
tems to be augmented incrementally, a workstation at a time. Finally, in terms of personnel,
great potential for cost savings exists in terms of a more productive work force within a less
bureaucratic environment—a function of greater desktop control.
(2.) Desktop Control. One of the readily apparent advantages of desktop
computers in a decentralized environment is that this environment brings computing power
closer to the end-user. As such, there is no longer as much a dependency on the technicians
behind the "glass house" to solve logjams in the system. With this greater degree of em-
powerment, the more educated end-user can better control the IS infrastructure and help an-
ticipate and make changes. This customization of the computing environment helps to
foster a greater sense of ownership among end-users; the increased motivation and involve-
ment of users can also increase overall productivity.
Empowerment at the end-user level and subsequent desktop control does not
come merely through decentralization. It is also the case that increasingly innovative and
sophisticated developments are taking place on the desktop at a much faster pace than at
the mainframe level. Industry trends and market dynamics are adapting desktop computing
features to meet the needs of their end-users. End-users have demanded a shift away from
the character-based interfaces; the graphical user interface (GUI) is becoming the norm.
End-users have sought technical flexibility to control their desktop interface, giving them
a standard "look and feel" that matches their intuition. The so called WIMP interface
—
Windows, Icons, the Mouse, and Pull-down menus—is becoming the de facto standard.
Voice commands and handwriting interfaces are currently making their debuts. Again,
these trends are introduced and becoming standardized at the desktop level. Desktop
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computers, not traditional mainframes with dumb 3270 terminals, represent the leading
edge and the future in this area—a trend with significant underlying implications.
(3.) Technological Flexibility. Technological flexibility refers not only to
the greater desktop control as discussed above, but more so to the variety of hardware and
software options available in a desktop environment. The move away from the traditional
mainframe environment, often regarded as too structured, "stove-piped," and proprietary,
has created a movement to the other extreme at the desktop level. IS professionals have not
wanted to be locked in to a monolithic structured environment, so the move has been to-
wards networks linking a host of heterogeneous desktop hardware and software elements.
IS professionals have not wanted to be at the mercy of one vendor, and their demands have
met with a market-wide race towards development and implementation of the almighty
"open system." End-users have not wanted to rely on technicians behind the glass house,
so they have been empowered with applications tools such as 4GLs and other end-user
centered applications. The call, in short, has been for technological flexibility at all levels,
and the desktop market has been the first to respond to the need.
(4.) Responsiveness to Business Change. This fourth attribute of desktop
computing is really an effect of its greater cost savings, desktop control, and technological
flexibility. The new challenges of the 1990s have introduced new business imperatives that
demand technological flexibility in the IS infrastructure. As organizational changes occur
to reflect a changing business environment, so too must the IS infrastructure adapt to effi-
ciently accommodate that change. All too often, "information systems have cast specific-
ways of doing business in concrete, not allowing a company to change its operating proce-
dures or move into new lines of business as quickly as management would like" [Ref. 1 :p.
296]. Thus, traditionally centralized and inflexible IS systems (most often epitomized by
the mainframe) may not only be inadequate in this new environment, but could represent a
serious liability. Many believe desktop computing, linked to local and wide-area networks
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to create a heterogenous distributed architecture, provides a more viable alternative to this
inflexibility. According to one IT consulting group:
Resources must be capable of dynamic response to increasingly volatile competitive,
market, and economic environments. Moves toward a different paradigm of IS de-
ployment has begun in many organizations... Increasing power and sophisticated of
distributed computing systems provide one of the elements of this paradigm. PCs are
bringing more powerful, user-friendly IS tools to the individual... small systems and
servers, as well as networking developments make it possible to offer new types of
distributed solutions. These allow IS to be more closely mapped to business process-
es at all organizational levels in order to provide more flexible and responsive tools
as business needs change. [Ref. 1 l:p. 1]]
D. THE RESULTING PARADIGM SHIFT: DOWNSIZING
Inspired by the promises of the desktop revolution and the opportunities of new
architectures, there is no doubt that IT is in the midst of profound change. A fundamental
shift is occurring in the way information is being processed, a move that is most often
described as an exodus away from the traditional mainframe towards architectures charac-
terized by networks of smaller, heterogeneous desktop personal computers and worksta-
tions. This trend, characterized by the shifting of processing from "big" systems to
"smaller" systems, has been labelled "downsizing" of information systems. Truly a para-
digm shift, the new opportunities offered by heterogeneous networks of powerful desktop
computers forces IS professionals to re-evaluate traditional methodologies of processing
information in light of new systems that are governed by different sets of rules.
After many years of practice, IS had started to get accustomed to managing comput-
ing on monolithic systems. IT was getting manageable, problems somewhat predictable.
That stability is now being overthrown with the introduction of the powerful desktop and
distributed, heterogeneous, and more unmanageable systems. The desktop computing en-
vironment represents a radically different world from its monolithic predecessor with new
software tools and computing techniques to operate in a distributed, multivendor, software-
centric environment that focuses on the end-user. This new form of computing will have
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pervasive effects that may require organizational re-thinking of traditional computing
methods, redeployment computing resources, and re-training personnel. IS professionals
will be forced to respond to a whole new set of management and technical challenges in
this increasingly complex environment. Thus, while downsizing may offer a vast array of
new opportunities, this paradigm shift does not come without an equal array of barriers and
pitfalls.
Some IS professionals have criticized the labelling of this movement as "downsizing"
as too restrictive a term and have suggested adoption of "rightsizing" as a more appropriate
term. Rightsizing implies choosing the most appropriate computer—regardless of size—to
best suit an organization's processing needs. Another term, "smartsizing," has also been
commonly used with the same connotations as rightsizing. Still, others prefer use of the
term "upsizing" to describe moving networked personal computers and workstations to an
environment with more robust features. This could imply actually moving to larger systems
or simply to servers with better capabilities in areas such as security and backup.
Whatever the most appropriate term, there is no doubt that increased processing pow-
er at all levels (but perhaps most noticeably at the desktop level) has created the opportu-
nities to think of new ways of processing information. It is necessary, however, to formally
define a vague term to clarify its connotations. For the purpose of this thesis, I will adopt
the Gartner Group's definition of downsizing:
Downsizing is the redeployment of information systems from a traditional main-
frame to a new architecture, with the primary goal of reducing total IT expenditures
across the enterprise. Downsizing generally refers to the migration of processing
from traditional mainframes to less expensive alternative mainframes, to midrange
systems for conventional application processing—e.g., batch or on-line transaction
processing (OLTP)—or to LAN-based networks of midrange and PC-based servers.
[Ref. 12:p.4]
Three essential ingredients contribute and fuel the downsizing trend: recognition of
information as a strategic asset, realization that the computing architecture is the essential
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means of defining an organization's "information strategy," and the belief that the promises
of smaller, increasingly powerful computers are the key to fulfilling that information strat-
egy. In short, many CIOs have seen the "writing on the wall" and are embarking on this new
voyage. Because technology is changing so rapidly, no one can be certain where the "voy-
age" will end. What has become too apparent to most organizations, however, is that the
future is away from the traditional mainframe—and organizations are getting on the down-
sizing train as soon as possible before it is too late.
One recent downsizing survey conducted by the Gartner Group at their Midrange
Computing Strategies (MCS) Conference polled attendees about their downsizing plans.
The respondents represented U.S. corporations with a total data processing budget of close
to $5 billion. Indications of the strength of this paradigm shift are evident in the results:
• 74 percent of the respondents indicated that they downsized applications in 1993.
• 96 percent indicated they were planning to downsize in 1994 or 1995
• To contrast this with previous trends, only 60 percent of those surveyed in 1992
indicated that they were planning or implementing a downsizing project.
[Ref. 13:p. 6]
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III. ESTABLISHING THE APPROPRIATE ARCHITECTURE
The previous chapter discussed the more traditional roles that the mainframe and PC
have played in organizations.As the term "rightsizing" implies, however, the downsizing
paradigm shift does not necessarily entail establishing an architecture limited to the central-
ized mainframe architecture or one that is exclusively built around a network of desktop
computers. Computing components can be bought, but a computing architecture must be
built to optimize processing capabilities. Processing power does not necessarily have to be
the mere sum of its individual computing components. New architectural tools are helping
to synthesize disparate computing components and are enabling more effective and effi-
cient forms of processing. Indeed, the momentum that has been driven by technological ad-
vances has unharnessed traditional mindsets and unleased new architectural ideas. This
chapter will discuss those new architectural choices and the tools that serve as their building
blocks. A final section will discuss migration strategies for migrating from traditionally
centralized mainframe architectures to client/server type environments.
A. ARCHITECTURAL DECISIONS
Before the advent of the powerful desktop personal computers in the 1980's, almost
all computers performed batch and on-line processing on the traditional mainframe with the
aid of "dumb" terminals. The glory days of the mainframe and its future faded dramatically
with the introduction of the personal computer. Innovative technology over the years has
enabled today's networked desktop computers with processing capabilities that claim to ri-
val those of the older, monolithic host platforms. Besides impressive performance mea-
sures, desktop computing now offers the advantage of user-friendly features such as
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intuitive graphical user interfaces (GUI's) on a platform much closer to the user—for what
first appears to be at a vastly more cost-efficient price.
Developing architectures, however, do not necessarily force IS departments into an
either/or decision between mainframes and networked desktop systems. New architectures,
such as client/server, are helping break the established boundaries of IS and are allowing
platforms to take advantage of mutual processing capabilities and exploit each other's
strengths. More flexible architectures, that include integration of current systems into new
architectures, are helping organizations respond to an increasingly global and competitive
environment in new and more effective ways.
1. The Client/Server Model
The client/server model, perhaps the most important architectural by-product of
the downsizing trend, was developed as a direct result of the increasing power and decreas-
ing costs of desktop systems. Simply put, the objective of client/server is to maximize ef-
ficiency and effectiveness of computing resources by allowing various elements to
specialize at what they do best.
One of the most pervasive new trends currently dominating the IS world, client-
server is a term that is quickly becoming an industry buzzword to describe the new move-
ment in distributed computing. Like so many buzzwords, however, the term client/server
has been used so often and in so many different contexts that it has come to mean different
things to different people. With so many degrees of distributed computing and varieties of
implementation, the terminology associated with client/server has become somewhat
confusing.
It appears that there are two schools of thought in this area. One school uses the
terms distributed computing, cooperative processing, and client/server loosely and inter-
changeably to describe the client/server architecture, while the other tries to define
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technical and semantic differences between the three. In general, however, most IT profes-
sionals would probably agree that client/server computing is a form of distributed comput-
ing and involves a degree of cooperative processing. Indeed, one IS professional tries to
clarify the terminology with the following assertion:
A distributed system is defined as a computing environment in which processes and/
or data are distributed throughout an organization with the requirement that a degree
of interaction between systems is required to complete processing the workload. It is
to this category that the term client/server relates. There is no particular signifi-
cance (other than semantic) in distinguishing client/serverfrom distributed systems.
[Ref. 14:p. 32]
The client/server term essentially tries to add a little more precision to the above
definition of distributed systems by defining the specific roles of computers within a dis-
tributed environment. Again, however, IT professionals have trouble standardizing this
term; one Chief Executive Officer of a mainframe software company believes "client/serv-
er is a term that has been overused and is confusing customers because different people are
using it in different ways" [Ref. 15]. Most IS professionals agree that the architecture splits
up the processing between a client, usually a desktop, and a back-end server. The degree to
which the processing is split up is where the definition becomes vague. Typical definitions
of client/server resemble that given by a well-known IS consultant:
Client/server architecture splits an application into a front-end client component and
a back-end server component. On the front end, the client Dart of the application,
running on a workstation, gathers data from the user, prepaies it for the server, and
issues a request to the server. On the back end, the server waits for requests from its
clients. When it receives a request, the server processes it and returns the requested
information to the client. The client then presents the data to the user through its own
interface. [Ref. 16]
This definition is somewhat incomplete. A more comprehensive definition would
include a discussion of the client and server roles in data presentation, application location,
and data management. The Gartner Group consulting service, recognizing the varying
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Figure 4: Variations in Client/Server Definitions [Ref. 9]
• Distributed Presentation: Also known as "screen scraping," the programmable
workstation (client) is run by a host (server) based application that alters the dull
3270 character-based format to a more friendly GUI interface. Additionally, the
workstation is prompted by the host to collect user inputs (using the GUI format)
and interact with the host. Some IS professionals do not regard this or the remote
presentation (see next paragraph) as "true" client/server.
Remote Presentation: Again, the desktop workstation acts like a client in this situ-
ation. In this case, the desktop runs a presentation application capable of receiving
messages from the host-based server and is able to utilize more involved GUI fea-
tures such as menus, windows, and dialog boxes.
Distributed Function: Commonly referred to as the "peer-to-peer" model, the ap-
plication is split between the between the desktop and the host (not necessarily a
mainframe), with each acting as the client (requester) or server (provider) at vari-
ous times. Processing may occur concurrently on both platforms, with control of
the application also shifting between the different nodes.
• Remote Data Management: In this case, the application wholly resides on and is
driven by the desktop computer acting as the client. The client submits data queries
or updates to the server, which responds to the request.
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• Distributed Database: The presentation functions, application, and some data
management reside on the desktop computer (client). Queries are submitted, as
necessary, to the server. Here, data may be distributed on multiple nodes through-
out the infrastructure. [Ref. 9]
Thus, it becomes more clear that the variance in IS professionals' definitions of
the client/server model occurs as a result ofthe varying degrees ofrecognition of client and
server responsibilities. One Computerworld survey reveals this disparity of IS profession-
als' definitions of client/server and illustrates how their definitions differ directly with the
perceived processing roles of the client and the server. The survey was based on the re-
sponses of 219 informations systems professionals who run applications in the client/server
environment. The following results were obtained:
Table 3: "HOW ARE YOU DEFINING CLIENT/SERVER?" [Ref 17:p. 8]
W7c 24% :' 33% 22%
:..;.;. ;.; \^mm,
Client Client Client Client Client
Presentation Presentation Presentation Presentation Don't know
and some busi- and some busi- and some busi-
ness logic ness logic ness logic
Server Server Server Server Server








tributed sys- tributed sys-
tems tems
With four almost equally divided definitions, the survey effectively illustrates the
disparate perspectives of the client/server paradigm and helps explain some of the customer
confusion. At a minimum, however, the survey in Table 3 indicates that all IS professionals
at least agree that the GUI interfaces of the intelligent desktop make it the platform most
capable of handling the presentation functions. At the other extreme, many organizations
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prefer that the client handle not only the presentation -related processing, but most—if not
all—of the application logic. [Ref. 17:p. 8]
Despite the varying opinions of where the processing takes place, what is clear is
that many organizations readily recognize the potential benefits of the architecture. As DoD
and corporations reengineer and redesign their organizational structure and information
processes, IS structures are reevaluated and realigned in accordance with strategic and tac-
tical objectives. Client/server is often argued to be the most logical means of realigning the
IS architecture because it exploits the same perceived advantages of desktop computing
(such as the reduced hardware and software costs with increasingly powerful performance
capabilities—as described in the previous chapter) while creating an environment that is re-
sponsive to business needs. Other unique and commonly cited client/server's advantages
include:
• System flexibility: The increasing standardization of protocols and "open sys-
tems" permits ad-hoc integration of disparate platforms. As requirements change,
the client/server architecture provides for the easy integration of additional nodes.
Furthermore, IS departments can integrate old technology with new technology
—
utilizing sunk investments instead of jettisoning old equipment. In this sense, the
client/server methodology can be implemented in a non-disruptive, self-paced,
manner.
• User-centric ity: Applications development tools (e.g. 4GL's) and data manipula-
tion methods focus on the user. For example, a user's database query is responded
to, theoretically, with "seamlessness." Physical location of application or data is
not pertinent.
• Vendor independence: Client/server unleashes IS departments from the depen-
dence on vendors' proprietary hardware and software. As more protocols and sys-
tems truly become standardized and open, users can select the "best of breed"
the system that provides the desired functionality for the least price.
• Reliability: Though one machine may go down, in a client/server environment
there is enough redundancy and machine independence to allow the business to
continue normal operations.
Despite the disproportionate focus on the personal desktop computer in client/
server, the mainframe and minicomputer can also play important and needed roles in this
architecture. Many organizations have been either strictly PC-centric or mainframe-centric;
client/server offers a blend. As suggested earlier, client/server is a flexible architecture that
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allows for the integration of current systems in a distributed environment. Mainframe and
minicomputers still have many desirable characteristics that workstations will have diffi-
culty matching.
2. The New Role of the Mainframe
Many IS professionals believe that the move toward client/server need not ex-
clude the mainframe. Distributed computing can mean that new technologies can supple-
ment rather than displace older ones. With the client/server model, a network composed of
mainframes (to include mid-range computers) and powerful desktop computers can all play
critical roles. Performance can be optimized by the shifting and redeployment of data re-
sources and computing power according to task requirements and system strengths. Many
IS consulting groups believe that the mainframe's role will evolve this decade in new ways
that are synergistic with the boom in distributed computing. Taking advantage of the main-
frame strengths and the current trends, they generally agree that the future of mainframe
computing will be as an enterprise hub with central roles in the areas of data management
and networking management.
a. Data Management Hub
Data management has always been a core strength of the mainframe. With the
mainframe hardware, operating system, and software optimized for management and
movement of large volumes of data, the mainframe has been commonly selected as the cor-
porate hub for mission-critical applications. Because of these sophisticated data handling
capabilities and the lack of feasible alternatives, the mainframe has historically
dominated—and consequently saturated—the data management market with its systems
and applications.
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Some estimate that corporations around the world have spent over $750 bil-
lion on software applications for IBM and IBM-compatible mainframes alone.
Furthermore, the performance capabilities of the mainframe are increasing at an impressive
rate along with the desktop. According to one report, the aggregate number of MIPS on
mainframes almost tripled between 1988 and 1991 to from about 125,000 to about 364,000.
[Ref. 18:p. 29] Some believe, however, that this market base and performance lead will
slowly be eroded by product developments that offer high-performance, low cost alterna-
tives that can potentially rival the mainframe. MIPS capacity on the desktop, for example,
grew much more than three times during that same period, thus reducing the mainframe's
relative capacity. This trend is likely to continue—some absolute growth in mainframe ca-
pacity, but an erosion in its relative lead. Unless alternative platforms can prove to be sig-
nificantly more cost-effective though, the mainframe's role in data management is unlikely
to change dramatically in the near future. According to the Gartner Group, the "MVS/390
is the logical candidate for the central data server and as a platform for data warehousing.
After all, it is home to the bulk of enterprise production data today, and therefore it involves
no effort to leave the data there" [Ref. 7:p. 26].
b. Network Management Hub
The distributed computing environment, current lack of uniform network
standards, and increasing transaction volume has increased the burden and complexity as-
sociated with managing multiple and diverse local area networks (LANs). Managing these
LANS separately is difficult and costly. Given its track record and promise of more pow-
erful mainframes, IS professionals believe that the mainframe's current network manage-
























Figure 5: Mainframe as a Network Management Hub [Ref. 6:p. 47]
Currently, IBM's MVS widely serves as a management hub for its existing
proprietary Systems Network Architecture (SNA). In addition, SNA backbones are used to
carry other LAN traffic throughout the enterprise. Expanding its role as a management hub
to other standards-based systems that are growing in this heterogeneous environment (e.g.,
TCP/IP, NetWare and IPX/SPX) is a logical extension to its current role. Managing the net-
works from one central mainframe would reduce complexity and redundancy by consoli-
dating monitoring and management of the systems. Because it is already often used as a
focal point for communications switching and is built to provide high bandwidth, the main-
frame' s role and capabilities make it a suitable and appealing choice in the client/server
environment.
Other essential features that a network management hub must guarantee are
data security and back-up. Ensuring that mission-critical data are secure and backed-up be-
comes significantly more difficult as the numbers and diversity of LANs increase. Using
its sophisticated security mechanisms and storage management, the mainframe can act as a
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central management point to ensure that only authorized users can access dispersed data-
bases and that those databases themselves are intact.
B. ARCHITECTURAL BUILDING BLOCKS
As important as the new architectures themselves are the tools needed to design, de-
velop, implement, and maintain those architectures. The technological advances in desktop
hardware have not come without equivalent advances in related software. From increasing-
ly more powerful operating systems to new software development approaches, the desktop
computer continues to rapidly progress with impressive innovations. Software developers,
driven by sheer number of PCs and the resulting huge demand for related software prod-
ucts, are responding with quick delivery of new and inexpensive software products to meet
changing business needs and architectural requirements. The high volume/ low price mar-
ket of desktop software is accelerating greater progress and innovation of software products
than is possible in the low volume/high price mainframe software market. The low prices
of software packages and innovation of software tools can, by themselves, make downsiz-
ing to smaller systems a very attractive option. This section will briefly discuss those soft-
ware building blocks that help build architectures like client/server—and provide
additional momentum for the downsizing trend.
1. Increasingly Sophisticated Operating Systems
As the desktop computing has evolved to play a more central role in corporate
computing, their operating systems have simultaneously advanced to run more complex ap-
plications and assume new duties that had been typically relegated to larger systems. Not
satisfied with the PC only playing the word processor and spreadsheet roles, vendors have
upgraded the technological capabilities to provide a robustness that had long been integrat-
ed into the minicomputer and mainframe.
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Currently, the more powerful 32-bit operating systems that are most competitive
within the client/server market include UNIX, OS/2, and Windows NT. Offering true mul-
titasking, multithreading, and multiprocessing, these systems can tap the power of 386,
486, Pentium, and PowerPC microprocessors and support applications with 32-bit address
space capabilities. According to Gartner Group, "current PC operating systems, such as
Windows NT, bear more resemblance to VMS (or even MVS) than they do their ancestors
(e.g., DOS) by implementing virtual memory, multiprogramming, pre-emptive multitask-
ing, 32-bit addressing and symmetric multiprocessing" [Ref. 7: p. 7]. Designed to support
the burgeoning distributed computing environment, these operating systems not only en-
able cooperative processing over multiple systems, but also can provide a degree of data
and networking integrity and security. Impressive systems management functions and pro-
ductivity tools for applications developers make the operating systems extremely attractive
in the client/server architecture.
With the wide variety of competing operating systems, a major question for
downsizing corporations is which one will be the desktop OS of the future? Currently, Mi-
crosoft Windows and Unix appear to be dominating the market, with Windows NT posi-
tioning itself to gain a large part of the market share. Windows NT is trying to accomplish
what Unix attempted a decade ago by providing a portable operating system across differ-
ent hardware architectures. Microsoft, however, is going a step farther by attempting to
provide a comprehensive set of standards with its WIN32 based operating system, GUI ap-
plication programming interfaces (APIs), applications, DBMSs, languages and Windows
Open Services Architecture (WOSA) interoperability features [Ref. 7:p. 45]. Although
Windows NT and Unix are certain to survive any operating system "war" and are likely to
be formidable players in the future, it is also likely that other alternatives will remain strong
market competitors. As such, trying to predict an "OS of the future" to use as a basis for
establishing a computer architecture is neither an appropriate or fruitful exercise.
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2. Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs)
Another manifestation of the increasing sophistication of the operating systems
are the impressive graphical user interfaces (GUIs) that they support. The GUI interfaces
available for the different hardware platforms and operating systems are becoming more
standardized; the major GUI interfaces outlined in Figure 6.
Microsoft Windows/Windows NT




Figure 6: Major GUI Interfaces
Providing a consistent seamless, interface for client/server related applications
and services, GUIs are replacing traditional character-based user interfaces that are acting
as a client front-ends. The consistent screens and menus help create a familiar and easy-to-
use "look and feel" that helps to mask the complexity and heterogeneity of the client/server
architecture from the end-user. GUIs help empower the end-user, allowing more intuitive
screens that allow easy retrieval and manipulation of corporate data—reducing training
time and expense while also boosting productivity.
3. Database Management Systems (DBMSs)
Once the responsibility of application programs, the role of managing and inte-
grating mission-critical data spread throughout a distributed environment is now the job of
increasingly sophisticated database management systems. Based on the relational data
model and the Structured Query Language (SQL), current DBMSs are able to select and
combine diverse data elements located in diverse and different systems. In typical
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configurations, the data management logic resides in the server and the applications while
control logic remains in the client. Sharing processes and exchanging information seam-
lessly from an easy-to-use client interface is critical to the DBMS. Advances in DBMS
technology allow some systems to retrieve and change data in multiple database servers.
Two problems that have hindered more rapid progress of DBMS' and total inte-
gration of all databases are (1) different SQL standards resulting in incompatibility prob-
lems and (2) legacy data that are stored in non-relational files. Tools have been developed,
however, to access and translate data resident in these platforms:
...front-end tools such as Information Builders' Enterprise Data Access (EDA)/SQL
are making possible end-user access to legacy data. These SQL front-end software
products and real-time language interpretations enable restructuring in relational
terms of legacy data for knowledge workers and make real the promise of universal
data access... EDA/SQL provides data access to more than 50 different data sources
and file structures on over 35 disparate hardware platforms. [Ref. 19:p. 1 1]
4. Middleware
Heterogeneous, distributed architectures such as client/server require interopera-
bility across dissimilar operating systems, communication protocols, and databases. Mid-
dleware is the enabling layer of software that accomplishes this. Residing between the
business application itself and the network infrastructure, the goal of middleware is to unite
independent local operating systems and transform them into a structure that creates the il-
lusion of being part of a single, monolithic system. Also nicknamed "glueware," this soft-
ware establishes virtual connections across hardware boundaries, "gluing" together
multiple users, workstations, application programs, CPUs, operating systems, network pro-
tocols, file systems, and other resources. A more precise Gartner Group definition is:
The layer of software between the end-user application code and the operating sys-
tem. Examples include DBMSs, UIEs (User Interface Environments) and TP (Trans-
action Processing) monitors. The end-user application invokes middleware services
via APIs (Application Programming Interfaces), and sometimes invokes operating
system services via different APIs. A middleware component (which is merely an
operating system application) also uses an API to call for operating system services.
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In a typical IS application of the 1990s, the less frequent of the three cases is the one
where application programs directly invoke operating systems without passing
through a middleware component. [Ref. 20:p. 10]
A difficult concept to define precisely, it is helpful to examine what middleware
is ultimately trying to achieve. Simply put, middleware allows one procedure to locate an-
other procedure anywhere on the network and exchange messages and information. This
exchange is permitted to occur between sender and receiver regardless of physically
separate locations, underlying communication protocols, and different operating systems.
In accomplishing this objective, middleware is also expected to provide the ancillary ser-
vices of data management, presentation, communication, and management services depict-























Figure 7: Middleware for Network Computing [Ref. 7 :p.9]
Organizations such as the Open Software Foundation (OSF) have helped to
standardize some of the middleware services through establishment of models such as the
Distributed Computing Environment (DCE). The middleware goal, to obtain a virtually
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homogeneous architecture through a system of transparent software services, still remains,
however, to be the greatest challenge of client/server and distributed computing.
5. Application Development Tools
Many transaction processing and management information needs are not being
met in the current mainframe environment for the simple reason that the cost of providing
software to meet new requirements is too high. The high expenses result not only from
software development, but also from the need to maintain applications as market and busi-
ness requirements shift. The consequential application development backlog has encour-
aged developers to seek relief through other avenues. The downsized environment, many
believe, offers viable alternatives through both the cost-effective purchase of increasingly
sophisticated off-the-shelf packages and new software development methodologies and
tools. This subchapter will highlight the impact of some of the new methodologies and tools
to include the notion of rapid application development (RAD), 4GLs, and CASE tools.
a. Rapid Application Development
Rapid application development (RAD) is a term that encapsulates the trend in
software development that digresses from the classic style of software development—best
epitomized by the "waterfall" model—towards a methodology that dramatically acceler-
ates delivery of software. The problem with the classic methodologies like the waterfall is
that the process requires comprehensive designs, formal reviews, and cumbersome docu-
mentation that often tie down progress in bureaucratic inefficiencies. RAD techniques dis-
courage this bureaucracy by eliminating formality and exhaustive reviews and encouraging
constant developer and end-user feedback as the system is being written. RAD methodol-
ogies include prototyping and incremental development.
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Prototyping, according to some experts, is used for the purposes of user inter-
face design, performance modelling, and assessment of functionality [Ref. 6:p. 229]. When
developing a product, it is difficult for programmers to accurately assess end-user needs
and requirements and determine realistic system performance measures. By modelling ini-
tial designs to the end-user, developers can rapidly determine errors due to misinterpreta-
tion and miscommunication and can also establish initial system performance benchmarks.
Because of highly productive prototyping tools, new versions that more accurately meet
end-user needs can be built. According to one IT consultant, this process "accelerates
failure"—developers can build application prototypes far faster and at far lower cost than
they could on the mainframe, giving them the luxury of building multiple prototypes until
they find one that works best [Ref. 21].
Incremental development is different than prototyping in several ways. In this
methodology, developers build and deliver only part of a system at a time. As end-users
identify a requirement, developers design, program, test and implement it as rapidly as
practical. In this fashion, end-users have the ability to gain the functionality of system very
quickly. This methodology can only work in systems that do not need to be implemented
as an integrated product.
b. Fourth Generation Languages (4GLs)
One tool that plays an integral part of the downsized environment, alleviating
the application backlog of the end-user and enabling RAD technology, is the 4GL. 4GLs
empower developers by providing an engine that automatically generates program code for
both application screens and program logic. Because of these sophisticated capabilities that
are sometimes easy enough for the end-user to understand and utilize, 4GLs have even been
touted by some as the panacea for the slow pace and high expense of application
development
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According to Gartner Group, 4GLs can be classified into three types: "front-
ware," database-linked, and database independent. Frontware 4GLs empower users by
adding the capability of rapidly generating front-end GUIs on the client-end to access leg-
acy data. Frontware 4GLs depend on middleware to access the data and handle resolution
of all software linkages. In contrast, a database-independent 4GL also requires middle-
ware, but not to the full extent that a frontware 4GL does. A database-independent needs
middleware primarily to help establish communication links and access to the database. A
database-linked 4GL is different than a database independent 4GL in that the application
development tool dynamically creates links to existing databases. In other words, the mid-
dleware component is built into the 4GL application development environment. In the cli-
ent/server environment where the mainframe maintains a role as a data server, all of these
4GLs can play an important function in extending the life of the mainframe. As new pro-
cessing requirements and information needs shift, 4GLs can play an important role in re-
sponding to changing business requirements. [Ref. 22:p. 2]
Some critics downplay the significance of 4GL technology. Although they ac-
knowledge some 4GLs offer significant benefits, they also believe 4GLs are generally pro-
prietary products that inhibit program portability. They state that 4GLs may be suitable for
small system requirements, but that they are generally unsuitable for complex programs re-
quiring intricate data handling and that 3GLs are often a much better solution. Although
these arguments may be valid in some instances, some very capable 4GLs have already
proven their worth in very demanding and complex environments. Ultimately, the suitabil-
ity of 4GLs very much depends on the particular system architecture and application re-
quirements. The areas where 4GLs are generally recognized to provide increased








Figure 8: Productivity Increases with a 4GL [Ref. 4:p. 212]
c. Computer-Aided Software Engineering (CASE) Tools
Another architectural tool that has been designed to automate large portions
of the application development process is a set of CASE tools. CASE tools can play an im-
portant role in the application development environment (ADE) by providing a central
repository for project planning, management and support activities, documentation, config-
uration control, and a software re-use while facilitating better communications among
project members. Such features can be of great value in a complex distributed environment,
potentially dramatically increasing productivity and reducing costs.
In the past, however, CASE tools have met with mixed reviews and have not
always lived up to expectations. Criticisms have generally been related to the high expense
associated with the purchase ofCASE tools and the lack of technological maturity. Accord-
ing to one authority, "To be effective, CASE tools must work closely with other develop-
ment tools such as repositories, code generators, and front-end development tools.
Unfortunately, few CASE tools have been able to do this well enough yet" [Ref. 6:p. 223].
Ideally, developers need I-CASE (Integrated CASE) tools that combine upper-CASE tools
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and lower-CASE tools so that they can be used together to develop network applications.
Upper-CASE tools are responsible for the mapping of business processes and data flow de-
signs, whereas lower-CASE tools use those designs to help generate code. Though ac-
knowledging weaknesses in past CASE technology, the Gartner Group expects a "rebirth"
in CASE with a new generation of tools and predicts "[a]s CASE vendors take on the
emerging new technologies, CASE-driven client/server application development will pick
up" [Ref. 23:p. 3].
C. MIGRATION STRATEGIES
Defining a corporate IS objective—such as off-loading the mainframe applications
into an open, client/server environment—may be much more easily said than done. Admit-
tedly, client/server and other distributed architectures that offer potentially large cost sav-
ings may be a desirable and achievable objective, especially given the advancement in
architectural tools. Yet, how is this downsizing actually accomplished? What kind of appli-
cations are best suited for an initial downsizing? Moreover, assuming identification of the
best application to downsize, what is the best method for migrating that code? This section
will take a look at the issues behind the ultimate objective, examining options and opinions
when selecting the best application to downsize and the available migration strategies.
1. Selecting the Best Application(s) to Downsize
Most IS experts agree that most successful downsizing projects occur by migrat-
ing only one application at a time (or portions thereof) and only after selection of suitable
"candidates." One general statement often made is that typical legacy systems with high
maintenance costs and low mission-criticality are the ideal ones to immediately downsize
and should be used as pilot projects. The Integrated Automation (IA) Corporation makes
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Figure 9: Choosing the Best Downsizing Candidate [Ref. 9]
Certainly, strong consideration is due to issues of mission-criticality and mainte-
nance loads. Governing decision making processes by those criteria alone, however, would
be to make decisions according to relatively superficial heuristics, as depicted in Figure 9.
Another dimension that is critical to examine when analyzing the feasibility of downsizing
an application is the actual structure of the code. It is important to have code that has clearly
defined functions and interfaces. Codes with such characteristics will make any re-engi-
neering and re-writing of complex code much less costly in terms of time and money. The
structure of the code may also help determine performance parameters in the new environ-
ment and the difficulty of separating portions of applications to enhance end-user features.
Figure 9 depicts the structure of the application code as a third dimension to consider when
choosing downsizing candidates. Common features of code that may lend an application as
an appropriate candidate for downsizing may include:
• Interactive processes between end-user and application
• Isolated functional components where application logic can be easily separated
from data and user I/O processes.
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Well-defined function interfaces (i.e., one entry and one exit).
Data structures that are easily separable from application logic (i.e., SQL calls are
separated into a logical set of functions).
New applications—so they can be optimized for the client/server environment.
[Ref. 24:p. 3-2]
On the other end of the spectrum, applications that should not be downsized are
those where the application and code have characteristics exactly opposite to the ideal can-
didates. These may include applications where there are few interactive processes, have
poorly defined function interfaces, and where data structures are integrated into the appli-
cation logic. More intuitively, applications that are seldomly used, frequently changed, or
about to be replaced are also not appealing candidates for downsizing [Ref. 24:p. 3-4].
2. Migration Techniques
Selecting appropriate applications to downsize is only the first step in
implementing a migration strategy. Having determined "what" to downsize, the next ques-
tion becomes "how?" When deciding on the particular method, Gartner Group recom-
mends first adopting a "global" strategy with regard to the ultimate fate of the mainframe.
If the goal is to junk the mainframe in the near future, for example, it can affect the migra-
tion technique. Gartner Group believes that organizations need to commit to either (1)
growing with their traditional mainframes, (2) fading out the mainframe while preparing
replacement systems, or (3) killing the mainframe as quickly as possible. [Ref. 7:p. 32]
With an overall strategy governing the fate of the mainframe, the technique for
migrating an application becomes more obvious. Such options generally include;
Maintain the status quo. When the application meets the criteria for candidates that
are not good choices for downsizing, leaving the application on the mainframe
may be the best option. As modifications and patches are required to meet chang-
ing business needs, maintenance continues to be performed in the traditional fash-
ion.
Surround and integrate. With this methodology, the application remains mostly
intact on the host. The idea is to build around mainframe and integrate it within
client/server architecture. Accessory applications may be added to increase the
overall level of functionality. One typical strategy is to simply add a GUI interface
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to the client while leaving the bulk of the application processing and data on the
mainframe.
• Transfer. This requires moving the application to the new platform as inexpensive-
ly as possible. The assumption here is that the code is relatively portable.
• Convert or emulate. Because the code may not be portable, conversion tools can
be used to modify the code to allow it to run on the downsized platform. Another
possibility is to emulate the application with a product that emulates current envi-
ronment. This is a low-cost alternative that retains familiar features and function-
ality.
• Reengineer. In this instance, the old code is still useful and applicable enough to
the downsized environment and business processes—the code simply needs to be
reengineered. Reengineering code (not to be confused with reengineering business
processes) is a software methodology that capitalizes on much of the logic of the
old code to help develop more structured, streamlined, and efficient new code. Of-
ten the new application is written using the old application as a skeleton and up-
grades are added as appropriate. CASE tools and 4GLs are useful tools. This
process may be both time consuming and expensive. There is the added danger of
replicating inefficient and outdated code, not to mention outdated business
functions.
• Replace. Business processes may have been reengineered (in this instance, reengi-
neering refers to streamlining of business processes, not code—more about busi-
ness reengineering is discussed in the next chapter) making the old programs
obsolete or reengineering the code may be prohibitively expensive in light of other
options. The old code is simply discarded in favor of more appealing software al-
ternatives. New tools enable faster, more efficient development of applications.
Off-the-shelf software also looks attractive.
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IV. ASSESSING THE RISK
Some view the trend that has resulted in the downsizing of information systems as a
dangerous fad. Every CIO must have an instinctive fear of their CEO glancing at an IS jour-
nal, reading an eye-catching article about a downsizing success story, and receiving a fol-
low-up phone call with the major question of "Why aren't we downsizing?"
The crucial question of "to downsize or not to downsize" has no easy answer. Many
questions on a wide range of topics need to be studied and analyzed carefully. Downsizing
a major information system can be a risky proposition with significant consequences for an
organization. Being able to accurately assess the risks associated with downsizing and to
make objective and intelligent decisions to the downsizing question is a critical skill.
For many organizations, business imperatives may pressure downsizing initiatives.
Perhaps a move to a new building with new space limitations, cost-saving mandates from
above, or new software requirements prompt the initial move—and limit possible options.
In such cases, downsizing may not be so much an option as a directive. In other instances,
an organizations may view downsizing as an opportunity to stay ahead of technology and
gain a competitive advantage. This organization may have fewer constraints on their op-
tions. Whether an organization is downsizing an information system in response to a direc-
tive or an opportunity, it is important to properly consider the risks and perform appropriate
studies associated with that decision. These studies have been typically labelled feasibility
studies by systems analysts and form the centerpiece of the systems analysis and the sys-
tems development life cycle (SDLC).
This chapter will examine three feasibility studies that are helpful in analyzing the
risks associated with downsizing information systems and should be completed during
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various stages of the SDLC and prior to committing additional resources. These feasibility
studies (or analyses) typically include operational, technical, and economic factors. To
broaden the scope of the operational analysis to include more organizational implications,
the operational feasibility study is re-labelled as an organizational analysis. Additionally,
as is often done, the economic analysis portion of this chapter is discussed in terms of a
cost/benefit analysis. Because these feasibility studies are completed as an integral part of
the systems analysis portion of the SDLC, it is important to first provide a brief overview
of the systems analysis process prior to addressing the feasibility studies.
A. OVERVIEW OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
Systems analysis is the "study of a current business system and its problems, the def-
inition of business needs and requirements, and the evaluation of alternative solutions"
[Ref. 25:p. 9]. Assessing the risk of downsizing is an essential part of the systems analysis
portion of the systems development life cycle (SDLC). The correct decision to downsize an
information system depends on an understanding of the business system and its problems,
the end-user requirements, and an understanding of the architectural choices. Systems anal-
ysis is a crucial phase of the SDLC. Though many different models exist for the SDLC, all
models generally incorporate a phased approach wherein the systems analysis portion plays
a key role in initially surveying the project scope and feasibility and ultimately selecting
the best solution from candidate alternatives. Figure 10 depicts the phases of systems anal-
ysis in one model of the SDLC.
1. The Systems Analysis Process
Systems analysis is a "process performed by many but practiced by few"
[Ref. 25 :p. 134]. Though it is the crucial process upon which all the subsequent phases of




















































Figure 10: The Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC)
[Ref. 25:p. 140]
haphazard approach. Good systems design and implementation are dependent on proper
systems analysis. The SDLC diagram suggests a more structured methodology to ap-
proaching systems analysis, an approach that will enable a more structured analysis and an
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opportunity to evaluate risks. The four phases illustrated in the system analysis portion of
the diagram are:
• Survey. A survey of the project scope and feasibility that serves as a preliminary
investigation of the proposed project. Initial parameters of the project are estab-
lished to include project scope, perceived problems, constraints, possible solu-
tions, and intended goals.
• Study. An establishment of a baseline of the current business needs and system to
provide insight to current problems, business needs, and implications of possible
solutions.
• Definition. A determination of the end-users' requirements. The emphasis is on
what the system is supposed to do, not how.
• Selection. The process of choosing the most feasible solution from the available
alternatives with a closer look at operational, technical, and economic feasibility.
[Ref. 25 :p. 167-169]
2. Determining Feasibility
One purpose of systems analysis is to estimate the risk associated with a project.
Feasibility studies should be conducted throughout all phases of the systems analysis por-
tion of the SDLC and serve as checkpoints for management reevaluation of the project.
This logical and objective methodology supports an approach that has been dubbed a
"creeping commitment" approach—as the project's feasibility is progressively validated
after each stage, the organization's commitment in terms of resources progressively in-
creases. If a feasibility study determines that risk is determined to be unacceptable, despite
any preceding commitments, then management should not continue with it.
[Ref. 25:p. 767]
In the early stages of systems analysis, such as the survey and study phase, the
feasibility study cannot be completed with great detail as no technically specific solutions
have been investigated. In the last phase of systems analysis, the selection phase, technical
alternatives have been specified and the feasibility study becomes much more accurate. It
is important for feasibility studies to be conducted—to some degree—after each phase as
conclusions can change with a better understanding of current problems, business and end-
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user requirements, and alternative solutions. Projects that may appear to be extremely
appealing at first may later turn out to be unattractive in light of increased information. It
is through the process of constantly challenging the organizational, technical, and econom-
ic implications of the proposed project that IS risks are objectively assessed and minimized.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
It is no longer enough for the IS department to merely support and respond to ad hoc
departmental needs. The role of IT and the corresponding IS architecture has become crit-
ically linked with the strategy and success of an organization. CEOs and CIOs need to take
a look at many organizational factors prior to making any commitments on whether to
downsize and prior to deciding what to downsize to. Downsizing is a process that reshapes
the way organizations work and compete; top-level managers must ensure that the process
will work and that the reshaped organization is in the intended form. In order to do this,
several prerequisites must be fulfilled. Unless these prerequisites are met, the organization
faces potentially high risks of failure. These failures may be manifested by either a failure
to meet cost and performance goals, or a transition to a downsized environment that fails
to meet organizational requirements. In order to avoid these risks, the top managers like the
CEO and CIO must:
• Understand the business needs
• Understand the business processes
• Generate organizational support
This section will examine these top-level manager responsibilities to the organiza-
tion—all essential requirements that must be met prior to committing to the downsizing of
major information systems.
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1. Understanding the Business Needs
The previous chapter described IT as a strategic asset. IT, however, can only be a
strategic asset to the degree that it supports the business strategy. IS systems must work in
concert with business strategy—one must be a reflection of the other (it should be footnot-
ed, here, that a "business" strategy is not limited to private-sector firms; DoD units, such
as ONI also need to develop a similar strategy on how best to carry out their assigned mis-
sions). Thus, as business strategy is planned and outlined, so too must IS strategy be
planned and outlined. In this process, specific methodologies may be used to analyze or en-
sure that IS aligns itself to the business strategy. For downsizing to work, planning efforts
must ensure that the downsized product is relevant to the corporate strategy. Accordingly,
DoD and private corporations need to examine and understand the key ingredients that
make their organization function successfully.
Analysis of critical success factors in strategic IS planning may serve as a useful
first step. According to one IS strategist, "critical success factors are the limited number of
areas in which satisfactory results will ensure competitive performance for the individual
department or organization. Critical success factors are the few key areas where 'things
must go right' for the business to flourish and the manager's goals to be attained" [Ref. 26].
Critical success factors can help a corporation analyze information systems they need to de-
velop, maintain, or change.
The management of Federal Express, the leading overnight package carrier in the
world, lists five critical success factors upon which the company's phenomenal success de-
pends. The first of these, "(to) continuously improve quality," is integrally linked to IT.
Federal express handles 1.5 million packages a day, using 430 aircraft, 31,000 delivery
vans, and 91,000 employees at 1,700 locations worldwide. Federal Express' COSMOS IIB
IS system, which consists of nine IBM 3090s linked to 75 dispatch centers and 24 call cen-
ters, handles the resulting 14 million transactions a day or 10 transactions per package in
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the system. Not only is COSMOS IIB the major on-line system for handling routing infor-
mation and tracking package status, but it is also the key component in providing feedback
for employees on quality factors such as on-time delivery, correct billing, calls answered
on time, resolution of customer complaints, and employee satisfaction. For Federal Ex-
press, management understands that quality is an essential factor for success—and that
their IS system is largely responsible for implementing that strategy. [Ref. l:p. 72-78]
Another popular methodology (among a vast array of others) for analysis of busi-
ness needs is the scenario approach. As the name implies, the scenario approach uses "what
if' hypothetical situations to analyze and plan for future business needs. In these scenarios,
top managers employ key variables such as the environment, trends, and events to analyze
and weigh what could happen under different sets of circumstances. Computer based deci-
sion support systems (DSS) can be used to help quantify the results and provide objective
results with which to help develop and implement the most appropriate IS architecture.
[Ref. l:p. 1 14] No single method is highlighted as a more appropriate than another; what
all have in common, though, are systematic and objective approaches to understanding the
business needs for the purpose of planning and applying the most advantageous IS
architecture.
2. Understanding the Business Processes
Understanding of the business processes goes one step beyond identification of
the business needs. A business need may be fulfilled without an understanding of the busi-
ness processes. What can result is a system that works, but not as well as it could work.
With an understanding of the business processes, all aspects of a system are broken down
to their individual components to the point where all linkages, interdependencies, and rela-
tionships among parts are clearly understood. With this accomplished, an organization can
identify and correct inefficiencies in a system. Information "barriers, bottlenecks, and
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blackholes" can be isolated prior to automation of the process by implementation of a new
system. By taking this step back from the playing field, IS professionals avoid the mistake
of applying the right technology to the wrong problem. By removing those inefficiencies
in the system, the only processes that theoretically remain are those that add value. Stream-
lining of these remaining processes ensures maximum efficiency and productivity.
Through this rethinking of the business processes, IS professionals identify the core value-
adding processes. When this process is automated, productivity can increase dramatically
instead of by token incremental improvement.
a. Business Reengineering
In their book Reengineering the Corporation, authors Michael Hammer and
James Champy champion the idea of reinventing American companies through the process
of business reengineering—"the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business
processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of perfor-
mance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed" [Ref. 27:p. 32]. The four key words that
the authors extract from this definition to explain this concept are fundamental, radical, dra-
matic, and processes.
The first key word, "fundamental," refers to the notion that companies must
ask themselves basic and fundamental questions about their operations: "Why do we do
what we do? And why do we do it the way we do?" [Ref. 27:p. 32]. Often, this questioning
helps identify commonly held, yet obsolete and faulty, assumptions about how business is
conducted.
"Radical" refers to the need for businesses to avoid timidly superficial chang-
es in the business processes; "reengineering is about business reinvention—not business
improvement, business enhancement, or business modification" [Ref. 27 :p. 33].
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When using the word "dramatic" in the definition, Hammer and Champy ad-
vocate major, non-incremental changes to the processes. More traditional approaches have
called for the fine-tuning of existing methods. When called for, Hammer and Champy
argue for a different approach:
Reengineering isn't about making marginal or incremental improvements but about
achieving quantum leaps in performance. If a company falls 10 percent short of
where it should be, if its costs come in 10 percent too high, if its quality is 10 percent
too low, if its customer service performance needs a 10 percent boost, that company
does not need reengineering. More conventional methods, from exhorting the troops
to establishing incremental quality programs, can dig a company out of a 10 percent
hole. Reengineering should be brought in only when a need exists for heavy blasting.
Marginal improvement requires fine-tuning; dramatic improvement demands
blowing up the old and replacing it with something new. [Ref. 27 :p. 33-34]
The last key word in the definition, "process," is the most important element
in business reengineering, yet the most difficult conceptually for managers. Corporate man-
agers have been bred to instinctively relate to their jobs in terms of people, their job descrip-
tions, tasks, and organizational structures. A process is different in that it focuses not on
these existing constraints, but on the collection of activities that acts on one or more inputs
to create a value-added output. Hammer and Champy call for the fundamental rethinking
and radical redesign of this collection of activities, not the familiar organizational entities.
In traditional attempts to cope with crises, corporations have typically selected from a menu
of three choices to resolve their dilemma: (1) bring in new people, (2) automate the task
with bigger and faster machines, or (3) restructure the organizational chart. These options
usually result in only superficial and marginal improvements. By reengineering the pro-
cesses, a new option is added to the menu, with potentially dramatic and radical
improvement. [Ref. 27]
As suggested in the previous chapter, IT can play a key role in business re-
engineering as an enabling force. According to Hammer and Champy, however, IT's key
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role is all too often miscast and results in exacerbating the existing situation. Automation
of existing processes, Hammer and Champy insist, is not reengineering.
...to paraphrase what is often said about money and government, merely throwing
computers at an existing business problem does not cause it to be reengineered. In
fact, the misuse of technology can block reengineering altogether by reinforcing old
ways of thinking and old behavior patterns. [Ref. 27]
Using IT to challenge old assumptions, alter outmoded and inefficient operat-
ing methods, and to break traditional rules is what reengineering is all about. Utilization of
Electronic Data Interchange to break traditional organizational boundaries, exploitation of
database technology to share information simultaneously, and harnessing the power of mi-
croprocessor to bring mainframe computing power to the desktop are all examples of free-
ing an organization from constraining assumptions. What IT enables is the notion of
discontinuous thinking—"identifying and abandoning the outdated rules and fundamental
assumptions that underlie current business operations" [Ref. 27:p.3].
b. The Total Quality Movement
Hammer's and Champy' s program of business reengineering shares some
common ground with some familiar business improvement programs, but differs radically
from others. The Total Quality Management (TQM) program and the U.S. Navy's Total
Quality Leadership (TQL) initiatives, for example, share a similar theme with business re-
engineering in that both recognize the importance of studying the business processes and
the primacy of the customer. Where TQM and TQL differ, though, is that these programs
seek to gain improvement of business process through continuous, incremental improve-
ment rather that business reengineering 's radical and dramatic remedy.
Quality programs work within the framework of a company's existing processes and
seek to enhance them by means of what the Japanese call kaizen, or continuous in-
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cremental improvement. The aim is to do what we already do, only to do it better.
[Ref. 27: p.49].
Manifestations of the total quality movement are seen in various management
and organizational development techniques designed to improve employee productivity.
Dramatic success stories in management, such as the Japanese utilization of W. Edward
Deming's TQM program to help revitalize the Japanese economy, have fostered a greater
appreciation for innovative management principles in the American economy. These new
principles stress quality, process redesign, employee involvement, self-managing work-
groups, teamwork, and job redesign. Whether the methods for approaching the analysis of
an organization have been business reengineering, TQM, or the sociotechnical system
(STS) approach, the pervasive trend has been a closer examination of the more elusive,
non-traditional aspects of organizations with an emphasis on the business processes. Peter
Senge, director of the Systems Thinking and Organizational Learning Program at MIT's
Sloan School of Management, encourages such thinking in his recent book, The Fifth Dis-
cipline: The Art and Practice ofthe Learning Organization, in which he prompts organiza-
tions to become learning organizations in order to survive [Ref. 28].
As evidenced through numerous corporate case studies, IT can act as a cata-
lyst for Hammer's and Champy's version of business reengineering and other programs of
process improvement. IT has characteristically been the tool through which traditional as-
sumptions have been broken and new ways of operating have become possible. The oppor-
tunities afforded by the new technologies available in a downsized environment can
translate into new processes for doing business, new windows of opportunity. Nonetheless,
when assessing the risks inherent in downsizing, it is inherently important to understand the
processes of the business. That is what this section has tried to emphasize. Whether or not
a business ultimately undertakes a downsizing proposition, a critical understanding of the
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processes can ensure a better evaluation of the possibly revolutionizing benefits of down-
sizing or the overly daunting pitfalls.
3. Generating Organizational Support
The greatest risks with downsizing may not be associated with the proper analysis
of business process, a thorough performance analysis, or an accurate cost-benefit justifica-
tion. Instead, the downsizing issues that may pose the greatest obstacles to progress are re-
lated to human factors. Downsizing can have generate organizational changes that can have
a profound impact on an organization's operating procedures and corporate culture. The re-
sulting fear factor can create widespread and unpredictable consequences that can affect the
success of the downsizing process. Before proceeding too quickly with any downsizing
plans, it is an absolute necessity to ensure that top corporate officials have "bought off on
the idea. Unless sustained top management commitment is forthcoming to help initiate the
process and overcome a resistance to change, the success of downsizing is at risk.
a. Top Management Support
Downsizing is as much a political issue as a technical issue. Top management
commitment is crucial in light of a potentially difficult migration process full of volatile
cultural and social upheaval. External factors such as underestimation of development or
training costs can shortchange the process. Internal conflict due to potential job losses can
delay and even sabotage progress. In face of unanticipated pitfalls, lack of absolute convic-
tion and support to guide the downsizing initiative will exacerbate a deteriorating situation.
Lack of executive support to provide constant leadership and guidance within a strategic
framework will ensure failure.
Despite the criticality of obtaining top management support in downsizing in-
formation systems, the task may be more challenging than one might expect. A study done
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by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's (MIT) Sloan School revealed surprising at-
titudes towards information systems on the part of CEOs. [Ref. 1 :p. 54-56] The study in-
volved two-hour interviews with CEOs from 84 organizations within ten different
industries and focussed around the CEOs' perceived value and expectations from IT invest-
ments. The results were disappointing for IS departments. Fifty-two percent of the CEOs
said that they were too unknowledgable about IT to direct their investments. The other 48
percent (see Figure 1 1) of the CEOs had varying attitudes about IT that reflected various
degrees of confidence in informations systems themselves and the IS departments. What
the study reveals is greater CEO confidence in the value of IS technology (38 percent) than
confidence in the personnel (20 percent). Furthermore, only 12 percent of the CEOs had
high confidence in both the technology and the people. Figure 1 1 illustrates why obtaining






















figure 11: I'll) Perceptions ot IS Systems and Personnel [Ret. 1: p. 55]
In order to overcome possible foot-dragging by CEOs, it becomes the respon-
sibility of the CIO to provide the leadership necessary to generate top-management confi-
dence in IS technology and personnel. If it does not already exist, establishing confidence
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in IS will not be an overnight process. Because of the career-threatening high stakes in-
volved in IT, the acronym CIO has sometimes facetiously been said to stand for "Career Is
Over." Instead of fostering that negativism, Michael Hammer suggests that it should stand
for "Chief Innovation Officer," with the IT executive using the position to take charge "as
a leader of a team that identifies new opportunities and implements new ways of doing
business" [Ref. 3:p. 1 1]. Accordingly, the CIO must establish credibility by showing he or
she understands business needs and processes and demonstrating how the IS department
can help increase the technological maturity of an organization through appropriate tech-
nologies. The CIO's ability to convincingly demonstrate and sell a vision for new technol-
ogies to the CEO is the key hurdle for any major IS project. Getting the CIO and CEO to
function as a team is a major prerequisite to further progress.
b. Managing Resistance to Change
With a united and committed management, the next step is to solicit the entire
organization's dedication. Downsizing information systems can have a profound organiza-
tional impact that can trigger many unanticipated responses. If the downsizing project in-
volves a major move off the mainframe to a PC LAN, for example, there will be an inherent
shift in the need for hardware and software skills. Those that may have spent their entire
careers within the glass house are likely to be ill-equipped to adapt to the requirements of
the new downsized environment. Little incentive exists for a COBOL programmer to assist
in the downsizing process when the individual realizes he or she is essentially helping to
make their position obsolete. In fact, much incentive exists for such an individual to dis-
courage a downsizing effort and perpetuate the status quo.
Unavoidably, downsizing will require change—and inevitably, change will
provoke resistance. Reactions to change will vary depending on the circumstances, but or-
ganizations commonly respond to change in four negative ways: (1) feelings of
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incompetency, powerlessness, and being unneeded among personnel, (2) an atmosphere of
confusion and unpredictability throughout the organization, (3) increased instances of con-
flict, and (4) a sense of loss. [Ref. 29:p. 397]
Unless proactive steps are taken to counter these negative reactions, the forces
of resistance can work to undermine any downsizing initiatives. Thus, the CEO and CIO
must acknowledge these predictable responses and work in concert to match each, in turn,
with a countermeasure. Four strategies should be considered to deal with the changes: (1)
establishment of training and support for the employees, (2) realignment of formal roles
and relationships to coincide with change, (3) establishment of arenas for discussion and
problem-solving, and (4) development of transition rituals to herald the "new" organization
[Ref. 29:p. 397]. Planning and implementation of these countermeasures to resistance can
help dissolve snowballing forces of resistance from gaining momentum and thus minimize
the risks of downsizing (see Figure 12). Nonetheless, the resistance to change and associ-
ated emotions brought on by downsizing are an unpredictable risk. Consideration and un-
derstanding of the human element are essential in an effective risk analysis of downsizing.
Reactions to Change: Strategies to Respond:
• Feelings of incompetency, • Establish training and support 1
and powerlessness programs for employees
Organizational confusion • Realign formal roles and
and unpredictability relationships
• Increased conflict • Establish arenas for discussion I
• Sense of loss • Provide transition rituals




The process of properly assessing risk requires examination of different management
and technical perspectives. The previous section focused on organizational aspects of risk;
this one looks at the technical aspects. An organizationally sound project does not neces-
sarily mean that technical criteria are being fulfilled. CIOs must assess the feasibility of a
downsizing project by also asking and answering several key technical questions:
• Is the proposed technological solution practical? [Ref. 26:p. 773]
Will it meet all of our current and desired performance needs?
1. Is the Technological Solution Practical?
Although today's rapidly advancing technology allows for the possibility of many
technical solutions, this does not necessarily imply that the solution is a practical one. Qual-
ifying as practical requires testing the proposed solution against such issues as system ma-
turity and the track record of technology. A practical system also implies that it is readily
achievable. The complexity generated by the heterogeneity in today's computing environ-
ment does not necessarily mean that a distributed system will meet that requirement. Thus,
the potential lack of standards and interoperability need to be examined. Finally, a solution
cannot be practical if there is not adequate expertise or time available to develop and im-
plement the proposed solution.
a. System Maturity
Many argue that in contrast to the mainframe's legacy of stability, the PC and
workstation have just entered into the big league of corporate computing and are still estab-
lishing and proving themselves as a technologically viable solution. A risk-averse organi-
zation, wary of vendors hawking advantages of distributed computing in a LAN
environment, may look at 30 years of mainframe experience in managing critical systems
in large organizations and choose to bet on proven technology. Undeniably, the mainframe
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boasts an impressive track record of successes (as well as an embarrassing number of fail-
ures). Perhaps this systems maturity and adaptation to its environment explains a recent
study conducted by the Business Research Group of Newton, Massachusetts, that estimated
that 75 percent of all computing tasks are still being performed on the mainframe
[Ref. 30:p. 36].
One explanation of the reluctance to downsize to smaller systems follows:
Savings can be achieved by moving applications to distributed networks or smaller
host processors, but such economies of scale alone are seldom motivation enough to
abandon mainframes... Many applications run on mainframes because they are of
such enormous financial value or critical importance to the organization itself. As a
result, information systems directors are reticent to trust such "mission-critical" ap-
plications and data outside of the mainframe environment; they simply feel uneasy
about losing the stability and reliability upon which they have depended for so long.
[Ref. 30:p. 36]
Others agree that the mainframe is a mature system, but footnote that it is 30
years too mature—a modem day dinosaur by computing standards. This camp believes that
the technology available on the desktop is mature and capable enough to meet their require-
ments and if they do not invest in the future now, there will be no future for them. The ar-
gument is that they cannot not afford to downsize unless they are willing to lose any
competitive advantage and possibly go out of business. To them, the debate is not whether
to downsize, but when and what to downsize.
b. Proprietary vs. Open Systems
Another key issue that must be technically analyzed when selecting or ap-
proving a system is how proprietary or open the target architecture is. The proprietary sys-
tem, a label that has most often been attached to the mainframe (although there have been
significant recent strides toward more open systems), has its obvious disadvantages of sin-
gle vendor lock-in and high cost by not allowing interoperability with other commercial
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components. Open systems try to achieve a state where all components are interoperable.
Open systems are defined as:
An approach to building information-processing systems using hardware, software,
and networking components that comply with industry-accepted standards such as
OSI (Open Systems Interconnect) or POSIX. [Ref. 6:p. 353]
What this requires is a comprehensive set of standards that will allow
construction of integrated systems and will provide interoperability among systems (i.e.,
exchange of data) and portability of applications. For the IS department, an environment of
open computing systems would not only generate the potential for considerable cost sav-
ings (driven by intense competition and the resulting economies of scale), but it would also
permit:
IS departments to gain independence from any specific IT vendor.
IS integration to be achievable across heterogeneous environments.
The opportunity to choose the best ofbreed in any technology area. [Ref. 20:p. 1]
Open systems may be practical, but the more important underlying question
is whether these systems are achievable. Reliably running and maintaining different system
elements running on different sets of computers is an inherently difficult accomplishment.
Chief among the risks of a heterogeneous distributed environment are the accompanying
technical complexity and the lack of any true standard to mitigate the effects of that com-
plexity and heterogeneity. Gartner Group believes the goal of complete interoperability has
created an "architectural crisis" or sorts:
IT moved from an era of manageable, homogeneous computing on monolithic sys-
tems in 1980, to an era of unmanageable, heterogeneous, networked systems by
1990. In 1980, after many years of practice, IS understood how to implement appli-
cations systems, buy from vendors and deal with end users. By 1990, virtually all as-
pects of information systems operating procedures were being overthrown, primarily
because of the introduction of PCs and distributed, heterogeneous systems. Comput-
ing architectures have spun out of control. Local Area Networks (LANs) have expe-
rienced runaway growth, and desktops and servers of all sizes and persuasions have
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appeared like weeds. Programming standards have eroded and the notion of non-re-
dundant, consistent, high-quality data is on the compost heap. [Ref. 7:p. 1]
The range of options created by the technological flexibility and the response
to the demand for open systems has multiplied the complexity of architectural choices and
the decision-making process and changed the procurement process. The quest for an open
environment has become a system user's dream, but a system integrator's nightmare:
Consider that in an open systems environment there are four or five major platforms
to choose from, four or more database management system providers, five or more
Communications alternatives, five or six productivity environments and so on. It is
easy to conclude that there can be 6,000 technical combinations possible for such an
open environment. (I have actually seen estimates of millions of combinations.)
[Ref. 10:p. 37]
A truly open system would require universal compliance to one set of stan-
dards; this is where the problems arise (in fact, only proprietary systems offer this option).
With much invested in already developed proprietary standards, software developers rep-
resenting major computing firms are trying to convince the market to adopt their standard
to protect their investment and secure an economically advantageous foothold. The UNIX
operating system, for example, regarded by some as running the most open operating sys-
tem available, has been fragmented by corporate politics and maneuvering. Being written
in C enables UNIX to be a very portable operating system; however, the many vendor mod-
ifications to it as part of proprietary infrastructures have resulted in the proliferation of dif-
ferent versions. Recent efforts by major UNIX vendors such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and
Sun Microsystems have been made to try to unify the operating systems as part of a Com-
mon Open Software Environment (COSE). The verdict on this eleventh hour attempt to
unify UNIX—coming only after the imminent introduction of Microsoft's Windows NT
—
is still out.
This corporate jockeying for market position in the world of developing stan-
dards is not taking place only in the arena of operating systems. The battle of competing
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standards is being waged full force in the area of networking protocols, user interface en-
vironments (UIE), distributed data access, transaction processing (TP) monitors, applica-
tions languages, and repositories. The goal of all this is to provide for the seamless interface
in a distributed environment where end-users will be able to run applications without
awareness of the system software, hardware platform, or network protocols being used. To
a large measure, much of this seamlessness is to be accomplished through the use of mid-
dleware (see middleware discussion in Chapter III), the comprehensive collection of appli-
cation programming interfaces that will veil the true system complexity and heterogeneity.
Middleware vendors and products such as IBM's System Application Architecture, Open
Software Foundations DCE and DME, and Microsoft's ODBC and WOSA hope to com-
pete for this growing market.
Thus, the complexity and confusion stemming from the movement to open
systems appear to be other manifestations of this architectural crisis that has been generated
by the prodigious growth of distributed heterogeneous computing environment. If the
downsized target architecture is such a non-proprietary and heterogeneous system, the risks
associated with open systems—an unmanageable complexity or commitment to an inap-
propriate or fading standard—must be considered. Furthermore, waiting for resolution of
differing standards may be counterproductive; comprehensive and clearly dominant stan-
dards may never emerge. The Gartner Group terms "openness in the absolute" as "non-
sense" and in the long run predicts a coexistence of multiple standards with interoperability
between them [Ref. 31 :p. 4].
c. Technical Expertise and Time Constraints
Finally, two important and somewhat obvious practical issues involve the
technical expertise of personnel and schedule requirements. Often disregarded or optimis-
tically estimated, these two constraints can foil a downsizing project and a potential
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business opportunity. The technology exists to implement a wide array of potential down-
sizing solutions; only well trained personnel can properly choose the most appropriate of
the seemingly infinite possibilities. Success in complying with a deadline, while still pro-
viding a quality solution, will also be directly dependent on the technical abilities of
personnel.
Downsizing from a mainframe to a distributed computing environment re-
quires shifting to a new set of technical skills. There is not so much a lack of personnel, as
the right kind of personnel. The downsized architectures come equipped with a different set
of tools—many more efficient and productive than their mainframe counterparts. The tech-
nological advances and advantages made available by OOP, 4GLs, and GUI interfaces, for
example, are too impressive to forgo. Unfortunately, the mainframe is not usually the plat-
form of choice for implementing these tools; as a result, the mainframe bureaucracy is in-
creasingly becoming "deskilled" in new developments. Some IS professionals might argue
that their departments cannot afford to not advance and learn with these new developments.
Corporate conferences on downsizing often compare the needed skills of today with those
of yesterday with illustrations such as Figure 13.




• Computer science degree
Today:
• C, CASE, OOP
• SQL and client/server
• Business and technical degrees
Figure 13: The Changing Skills of IS [Ref. 32:p. 214]
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Strategies to cope with a shortage of technical skills vary from retraining, to
the hiring of consultants, to outsourcing. The hiring of outside system integrators and con-
sultants has often provided efficient and effective relief to organizations with an over-
whelmed and underskilled staff facing downsizing problems. Increasingly, however,
retraining of internal personnel has been seen as the long term solution to a shortage of tech-
nical skills—in light of fears that the consulting option "may leave you holding the bag
once the new platform is up and running" [Ref. 33:p. 82]. A more conservative strategy,
designed to minimize risk, is to conduct comprehensive retraining with the consulting firm
while downsizing.
2. Will the Downsized System Meet Performance Requirements?
When it comes to downsizing, two distinctive camps of IS professionals are sep-
arated by a wide spectrum of performance issues. According to one camp, downsized sys-
tems offer viable alternatives to the mainframe and promise similar performance with huge
savings. The opportunity to migrate to smaller systems, that appear to offer similar speed
and storage capabilities at a fraction of the mainframe costs, is too attractive for them to
resist. They support a mass exodus to the distributed computing environment. The other
camp staunchly defends the centralized environment and its track record for handling com-
plex, mission-critical applications. Expressing doubt over the technical immaturity of
smaller systems, they believe that only the mainframe can provide the full range of required
functionality within certain performance parameters.
The next few sections will examine both sides of the debate. In the context of this
thesis, "performance" connotes characteristics such as flexibility and scalability, process-
ing speed (MIPS rates), throughput, integrity and security, and availability.
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a. Flexibility and Scalability
Computing systems can evolve and grow in two different directions, either
vertically or horizontally. A vertically expanding system is one that grows by increasing
the resources of a single computing node with the addition of more memory, more storage
capability, more terminals, or more processors. In contrast, a horizontally expanding
system grows by adding more nodes rather than increasing the resources at a single
element.
In the past, the traditional mainframe computing systems have sometimes
only been allowed to expand vertically. With rapid technological advancements in proces-
sors and increasing corporate appetites for more processing power, typical host systems be-
came outdated and inadequate after five productive years. At this critical junction, a
corporation that may only have needed a fractional increase in computing power had lim-
ited options to make small increments to capacity (e.g., by adding more memory, more I/O
channels, etc.). At some point, they needed to buy entirely new mainframes that may have
dramatically exceed new requirements. Historically, it has also been the case in traditional
product lines that the same operating systems and application development environment
(ADE) have not spanned the range of computing architectures. Thus, a corporation that
needed to upgrade from a mid-range computer to a larger mainframe was forced to go
through the major and disruptive evolution of migrating the software to the new system and
go through a new learning process for all IS personnel. This type of vertical growth has
three major limitations:
• potential to reach systems limit
• inflexibility in configuration
• potential change in software environments [Ref. 34:p. 100]
To be sure, the degree of mainframe scalability across its systems, interoper-
ability among systems, and consistency in its software and ADE has grown proportionally
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to the increased market demand for such features. And, to a considerable extent, these
mainframes characteristics have evolved dramatically since its early beginnings. Systems
scalability and flexibility, however, tends to be much simpler in a downsized environment.
In terms of granularity (the size of the step that must be taken to increase in functionality
such as processing power or storage capability) and the corresponding price/performance
ratio, the popular consensus is that the mainframe cannot compete with a workstation or PC
in a distributed environment. The granularity of the system is also complemented by con-
figuration flexibility, offering the capacity to increase resources in different locations to ac-
commodate different IS needs of the organization.
b. Processing Speed
One measurement that is often used to compare technical capabilities relative
to costs has been the price to performance ratio. Millions of instructions per second (MIPS)
rates tend to be the most widely used measure of performance, and are believed to represent
the processing power accomplished by one or more processors.This performance measure
is both so commonly used and misunderstood that some suggest a more appropriate break-
out of the acronym is "meaningless indicator of processing speed."
Firstly, measurements of MIPS differ between different architectures; RISC
MIPS, IBM S/390 MIPS and Intel MIPS, for example, cannot fairly be judged against one
another as all use different sets of instructions. Furthermore, it is important to note that
MIPS is a measure of instructions executed per unit time, and not throughput. The MIPS
rate required varies according to a number of factors. Computing machines that are
comprised of operating systems, database, and communications systems may be required
to execute more MIPS and utilize more processing time to provide the necessary level of
functionality than a system that does not have all these components. Additionally, some
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application software and compilers are written more efficiently than others and require a
fewer number of instructions to be executed.
The phenomenal increase in the MIPS capabilities of smaller machines has
enabled a network of workstations in a downsized environment to appear as a much more
attractive computing alternative than the mainframe, especially when comparing the price/
performance ratios. For the majority of desktop applications, however, MIPS issues are
largely irrelevant in light of the minimal CPU execution time as compared to the I/O wait
time. In many instances, MIPS rates are a relatively insignificant feature and become an im-
portant factor only when transactions are CPU-intensive (such as in scientific applications)
due to time-consuming processing requirements. Thus, MIPS rates should only become a
significant performance requirement and a potential technical risk when an application is
processing intensive and the CPU becomes the source of a bottleneck.
The Gartner Group outlines a similar argument when comparing mainframe
to PC MIPS:
If you go to a typical mainframe shop and count the on-line DASD and divide it by
the aggregate processing power, you would find that there are between 3,000 and
5,000 megabytes of data per MIPS. In a typical workstation, the ratio is more like 20
to 50 megabytes per MIPS. That is a two orders of magnitude difference. By that ra-
tio, mainframes are data-rich/MIPS-poor platforms, and comparably speaking,
workstations are MIPS-rich/data-poor platforms. Which is why you tune for MIPS
on a mainframe because it is the most constrained resource... We would never pro-
pose to use dollars per MIPS for making a platform choice. It is an interesting metric
within a family of processors, but is not interesting between different types of pro-
cessors. [Ref. 7:p. 63]
c. Throughput
The mainframe's core strength is often seen as its ability to efficiently manage
and move large volumes of data. Technically speaking this translates to low response times
and correspondingly high throughput. The hardware, operating systems, and supporting
software have all been optimized to support this data management capability (as discussed
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in Chapter II). The enormous bandwidth and the ability to manage multiple complex tasks
simultaneously have become mission-critical elements for some corporations; these capa-
bilities are often needed to support bandwidth-intense applications that utilize multimedia,
graphics, video, image, and voice. Graphical user interfaces, 4GLs, and flexibility
—
strengths of the desktop computing architecture—may not be pertinent in many cases. Ac-
cording to one expert:
The mainframe's strength is maintaining order in what could all too easily become
chaos in a totally distributed environment: assigning order of admission, changing
data, logging in updates, and being prepared for disaster recovery. The mainframe is
enormously efficient at anticipating an I/O gap and dealing with another job simul-
taneously to optimize processor performance and minimize the wait-state. Parallel-
ism, bandwidth and well-developed software applications give it incomparable
throughput capability. [Ref. 35:p. 34]
One of the areas that the mainframe hardware and software have been
groomed for efficiency over the last three decades has been on-line transaction processing
(OLTP). Because MVS-compatible programs and applications have established a proven
track record in protecting data integrity and guaranteeing reasonable response times, those
systems currently manage the vast majority of data for large enterprises such as banks, air-
lines, and insurance companies. Corporate customers continue to rely on the mainframe as
a platform of stability for mission-critical OLTP. Admittedly, speed, storage capacity, and
cost factors are important. Yet, what is the most cost-effective way to work? An IS struc-
tured around the mainframe has repeatedly shown itself to be a system capable of meeting
incessant demands of unpredictable complexity in the face of critical deadlines. Many sys-
tems dependent on OLTP demand the right mix of MIPS, I/O (input/output), and through-
put to maintain their competitive advantage. Many companies prefer to rely on the robust
performance of the mainframe rather than venture into questionable risks associated with a
downsizing project.
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For years, the workstation's progress in the OLTP market has been con-
strained by its limited I/O capabilities. In commercial record-handling applications, 20 to
30 disk accesses may be required for each transaction of medium complexity; a processing
rate of 10 such transactions per second thus requires 200-300 accesses per second. Though
this rate can now be handled by minicomputers and workstations, the technology has only
recently become readily available.
Despite advances in the I/O capabilities of workstations, the several hundred
disk accesses per second achievable by these servers do not match the mainframe's capa-
bilities. The 10,000-15,000 I/Os per second that are manageable on a large mainframe
make it the platform of choice for corporate applications that require such demanding trans-
action rates. [Ref. 4:p. 28 & 67]
Thus, though minicomputers and workstations that have not been able to
match top of the line mainframe OLTP performance in these areas, these smaller systems
may satisfy less demanding OLTP applications with moderate transaction rate require-
ments. One article entitled "PCs Break Into the OLTP Ranks" explains the market change:
That (OLTP) picture is beginning to change. Powerful new PC hardware and oper-
ating systems provide the performance, security, multiprocessing and multitasking
capabilities usually associated with much larger systems, making downsized corpo-
rate backbone applications possible. And that's attracted vendors of transaction-pro-
cessing (TP) monitors. These are the systems that furnish the security, data
management, communications and development tools needed to build and run OLTP
apps. [Ref. 35 :p. 32]
The author of this article goes on to support his claim by providing examples
of three different companies that have developed UNIX TP monitors that will support the
ability for Macintoshes, PCs, and workstations running Windows, OS/2, and UNIX to
function as full-featured clients. Additionally, fully downsized versions of IBM's Custom-
er Information Control System (CICS)—the most pervasive and acclaimed of all TP mon-
itors—are now available on OS/2, IBM's version of UNIX (AIX), and Windows NT. The
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administrative computing department at Tulane University in New Orleans claims to have
saved $135,000 per year in maintenance costs alone by moving only a portion of its CICS
applications down to 486-based PCs and RS/6000 workstations running OS/2 and ADC.
[Ref. 35:p. 32]
d. Integrity and Security
Decisions to downsize information systems have sometimes occurred based
on the myopic focus on potential cost savings while neglecting other important concerns
such as integrity and security. Because admissions of security loopholes are shunned, doc-
umentation of case histories lamenting costly security oversight is not readily available.
Nevertheless, the lack of a guarantee of proper security is a major cause for concern when
downsizing. One major belief is that mainframe-strength security systems are simply not
as readily available—or as robust—in a distributed environment.
The seriousness of this perceived problem is compounded by the fact that it is
extraordinarily difficult to manage security in an environment that has constantly changing
hardware, operating systems, and databases. It appears that the features that are so often
highlighted as an important advantages of distributed systems—cost savings and flexibili-
ty—come at the expense of security. "When companies cannot afford all the security in-
volved, they just don't talk about it" commented a Database Associates professional in
Morgan Hill, California. "People don't seem to worry about it too much. They keep their
fingers crossed that it won't cause major problems." [Ref. 36:p. 25]
While some organizations are not willing to put much stock in security at the
LAN level, others have already made their commitments to downsizing and are resolving
the security issues through a variety of methods. One of these methods is to firewall a LAN
from external access. Such an approach was taken by Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse
in Lebanon, N.H. when it junked its mainframe in February 1992 and committed itself to
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an open and distributed system. The firm purchased a central security system form Sequent
Computer Systems, Inc. in Beaverton, Oregon for six large Unix-based servers that con-
nected several hundred workstations and several thousand PCs. The inevitable trade-off
they faced was the decreasing access with an increasing level of security.
Even so, many corporations feel that downsized systems can meet or exceed
mainframe equivalent security. [Ref. 36:p. 25] In fact, the Gartner Group also takes this
position in a series about downsizing with the following assertion:
Downsizing does not necessarily compromise a system's general trustworthiness...
Although ease of access, a secondary objective of downsizing, could cause exposure
in security management, the lack of security is not a technical issue. Many systems,
particularly in the midrange, have been qualified at higher Department of Defense
security levels than mainframes. [Ref. 37:p. 4]
e. Availability
Unpredictable system outages that prevent access to mission-critical applica-
tions can be very costly to an organization. Continuous availability, the expectancy of reli-
able service without system outages, has almost become a built-in feature of the mainframe
environment and has contributed to its reputation of stability. Back-up components auto-
matically take over in case of failure. The centralized nature of the mainframe and the con-
centration of processing resources naturally supports such availability because of the fewer
possible points of failure.
The issue of availability in distributes systems, however, is a little more com-
plex. At first it would appear that a commitment to distributed computing may require a
concomitant acceptance of reduced availability due to the many possible points of failure.
By its very nature, however, a distributed system provides redundancy. Even if a local pro-
cessor fails, the entire system, in general, will not fail.
Although the mainframe has generally enjoyed a better reputation for provid-
ing a high degree of availability, the distributed computing environment is making up lost
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ground rapidly with advances in fault-tolerant technology. Fault tolerant technology creates
redundancy within a distributed architecture by duplicating every major component within
one module. If a component fails, a diagnostic link will immediately inform the service
center and automatically enable a substitute component while the faulty component is re-
paired within 24 hours. As it becomes prohibitively expensive to duplicate all components,
redundancy only at strategic locations becomes a reasonable compromise. Successful
implementations of this strategy have been implemented with favorable results. Often the
fault-tolerant system is used as a front-end to a mainframe in a client/server type
environment.
D. COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The purpose of the cost/benefit analysis is to summarize all of the estimated costs as-
sociated with a downsizing project in sufficient detail to give top decision makers the ability
to decide whether or not to proceed with the process. Costs and benefits should be incre-
mentally more accurate with each succeeding phase of the SDLC. Traditional steps for per-
forming a cost/benefit analysis require estimation of a variety of factors:
• cost of operating the current system
• cost of the downsized system or proposed system
• costs associated with all of the phases of the SDLC
• description of the intangible costs and benefits
• basis for estimating how the above costs and benefits will change in the next few
years due to such factors as changing economic and business trends
• quantification of the risks for proceeding or discontinuing the project [Ref. 6:p. 7 1]
Putting these guidelines in the context of a downsizing project, the return on invest-
ment may be determined by comparing the conversion costs and the costs of operating in
the new environment against the cost ofcontinuing to operate in the current environment—
all over a setperiod of time (e.g., five years). This section will analyze potential conversion
costs and highlight the often subtle costs of operating in a distributed environment. Because
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not all downsizing-related costs are readily identifiable, the last sub-section will examine
some intangible cost considerations.
1. Conversion Costs
The initial transition costs in a downsizing program can vary tremendously ac-
cording to the scope of the project and the migration strategy. For example, if a
corporation's downsizing strategy is simply to downsize one non-mission-critical applica-
tion with a "surround and integrate" migration approach (see Chapter HI), then the conver-
sion costs can be relatively small. A "surround and integrate" migration strategy leaves the
application relatively intact on the host mainframe and accessory applications are added as
needed (typically for a GUI interface). If, however, the corporate migration strategy is to
"kill" the mainframe and to off-load all applications, the transition costs will be dramati-
cally higher.
The conversion costs fall within two categories: the cost of migrating the applica-
tion and the costs of new hardware. The cost of migrating the application will depend on
the migration strategy. Rewriting the code for a mission-critical application, for example,
is obviously tremendously more expensive and time-consuming than buying ready to use
off-the-shelf software. IS professionals need to analyze the trade-offs between costs and
performance factors when deciding on a code migration strategy.
Similarly, the conversion costs associated with the purchase of new hardware will
also vary significantly according to the migration strategy. A "surround and integrate" mi-
gration might entail merely replacing "dumb" 3270 terminals with intelligent workstations
while keeping the bulk of the processing on the mainframe. Such a move would certainly
not result in as many initial hardware expenses as a migration strategy that would scrap the
mainframe. The Gartner Group estimates that:
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...(when) simply moving applications from one platform to another, the break-even
point usually falls between two and four years. However, if companies exercise the
"opportunity option" to move to a more open environment or toward distributed or
client/server computing, initial costs could be substantially higher and thus delay
reaching the break-even point by one or two years. [Ref. 38 :p. 9]
2. Operating Costs
Probably a more difficult challenge than estimating conversion costs is the task of
estimating operating costs in the new environment. Many times, downsizing decisions are
based on the attractive hardware price/performance ratios offered by the current desktop
environment. Decisions often do not account for other quantitative and qualitative factors
that are an integral part of the day-to-day operations in a distributed environment. Contrast-
ing mainframes at $50,000 per MIPS to a UNIX machine at $500 per MIPS, for example,
can be a very misleading comparison. The processing power does not take into account a
myriad of the other technical and non-technical issues inherent in distributed systems.
Estimating costs of distributed systems requires looking at the cost of not just the
machines themselves, but also the significant overhead that accompanies networked archi-
tectures. Costs grow as the complexity of networks grow due to factors such as increased
heterogeneity, the additional layers of software (e.g., middleware) and expertise necessary
to support such diversity. Identification and estimation of cost elements such as data man-
agement capabilities, labor costs, security, maintenance, ease of use, and business
responsiveness—to name a few—are also crucial to completion of an accurate cost/benefit
analysis, but are often downplayed.
a. Life-Cycle Cost ofa Downsized System
One of the fundamental reasons that is repeatedly cited for the downsizing
trend is that traditional mainframes are simply too expensive compared to networked work-
stations, PCs, and other downsized alternatives that are currently available in the market.
The economies of scale that once made the mainframe the most cost-effective computing
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solution is perceived to have been inverted. The focus, however, has primarily been on the
appealing hardware and software costs of downsized systems and has tended to ignore full
life-cycle costs of downsized systems.
(1) Hardware costs. Hardware components represent perhaps the most visible
and tangible costs. Overhead transparencies, similar to the one in the Table 4, frequently
illuminate executive boardrooms to illustrate price differences and trends of initial
hardware costs.
Table 4: PRICES: MAINFRAME AND WORKSTATION [Ref. 9]
Cost Per Mainframe Workstation
MIPS $100,000-$ 150,000 typically less than $500
Megabyte Memory $2000-$4,000 typically less than $100
Megabyte Disk $5-$ 10 $l-$2
While these price/performance ratios of desktop systems are impressive,
desktop hardware components are becoming obsolete at a faster rate than mainframe tech-
nology. Replacing hundreds or thousands of desktop computers in very large organizations
every few years can become a very expensive proposition. Even with the frequent
replacements of workstations, the hardware costs of desktop systems really represent only
a narrow slice of the total IS budget.While Table 4 illustrates the current unit costs, Table
5 shows the historical price and performance trends for the workstation, minicomputer and
mainframe. Again, though, such tables generally tend to illustrate only those aspects of
computing systems that are discrete and readily quantifiable. End-users tend to be more im-
pressed by large numbers representing speed and storage capabilities than with qualitative
explanations of security and reliability. Thus, while Table 5 dramatically depicts the
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industry's downsizing direction and potential, it does an inadequate job in illustrating other
important attributes of both PC and mainframe systems and their full life cycle costs.
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Internal Memory (MB) 32 8 2
Task Capacity (tasks) 16 8 4
Cost $5,000 $100,000 $1,000,000
(2) Software costs. Cost comparisons of development and maintenance of
mainframe versus desktop software have highlighted significant cost differences that are
commonly perceived to favor smaller systems. The Consolidated Insurance Group, prior to
downsizing to a PC LAN, utilized a $200,000 mainframe-based, general-ledger program to
maintain its accounts. After downsizing, the insurance company switched to a $595 off-the-
shelf program to perform the same functions—a 300 to 1 price advantage over the
mainframe version [Ref. 6:p. 5]. Other comparisons, such as the following observation,
have noted price disparities:
In one-on-one comparisons of packaged software between mainframes or minis and
PCs, the price comparison is so vast as to be almost ludicrous. Typical PC packages
cost from $50 to $500; typical mini and mainframe packages cost from $5000 to
$50,000. The 100-to-l advantage in cost is a good rule of thumb. [Ref. 6:p. 57]
There is little dispute over the cost advantages of a single software package
for a desktop environment over one built for a mainframe system. Organizations, however,
need to make one additional consideration. How many individual software packages do
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they need to buy to support hundreds or thousands of networked desktops? A 100-to-l cost
advantage quickly disappears when large quantities of software packages with documenta-
tion are purchased to meet corporate-wide requirements. Furthermore, because of the short-
er life-cycle of desktop software, organizations may find themselves spending money to
support periodic upgrades to new and improved versions. Acquisition of site licenses can
alleviate, but not remedy, this situation.
(3) Full Life-Cycle Costs. Convincing price comparisons of hardware and
software costs are often used to help justify moving to smaller systems throughout industry
journals and trade shows. The focus tends to be on hardware and software
—
capital costs—
not the entire life cycle. One study performed by the Gartner Group helps refute the impor-
tance of capital costs. In it, the Gartner Group estimated the average five-year life cycle of
an average PC in a corporate environment to be $40,124, with capital-related costs account-
ing for only 15% of the total life-cycle costs. The other 85% percent of the costs were per-
sonnel costs, related to administrative and technical support as well as end-user operations.
Figure 14 illustrates these findings. [Ref. 37 :p. 6-7]
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The Gartner Group attributed 56% of the total costs, by far the most signifi-
cant portion, to labor related to "end-user operations." End-user costs are incurred because
there may be fewer formal IS billets, and so the functions that were formerly being per-
formed by the technicians are now performed by end-users at the departmental level. Ac-
cording to a noted expert, "As a distributed system evolves, users may assume a role in its
design and operation. As desirable as this is, it also can result in a substantial expenditure
of bootlegged time that is not explicitly identified as a development cost" [Ref. 39:p. 15].
Thus, IS personnel costs on paper may appear to be diminishing, when in reality, the costs
are merely being shifted to the end-users. End-user operational costs include the following:
• Data management. This refers to the end-user requirement to perform a large de-
gree of data manipulation formerly done by IS personnel—such as backup, con-
version, compression/decompression, transfer, encryption, organization, and
sharing of files.
• Application development. Ranging from spreadsheet work to coding using lower
level languages, more and more informal application development is being done
by the end-user to assist in job-related tasks.
• Formal learning. Classroom training time is often needed to get familiar with ei-
ther applications or development tools.
• Casual learning. On-the-job learning substitutes for formal learning when formal
training is not available.
• Peer support. The office PC guru spends much of his or her time substituting as the
"help desk," taking that individual away from primary duties.
• Supplies. The purchase of expendable materials at the end-user level to include
everything from paper to diskettes.
• "Futz" factor. The time squandered unproductively in an application, whether it is
playing with different fonts or conducting personal business. [Ref. 37 :p. 6-7]
b. Hidden Overhead Costsfor Downsized Systems
In general, mainframe-based systems can be classified as capital intensive
whereas PC LANs can be labelled as more labor intensive. In a centralized architecture, all
major functions can be performed at the data center; core teams of highly specialized and
trained personnel are easily capable of maintaining applications and system functionality
for thousands of users. A distributed environment shifts many of those centralized
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functions to the department and end-user level. According to studies, some distributed sys-
tems (client/server) will require a support person for every 35 users, with support costs be-
ing three times as much as the hardware and software [Ref. 40 :p. 28]. Table 6 reflects the
relationship between labor and capital cost as the computing platform changes. •-




PC (Enterprise Network) 61% 39%
PC (LAN Work Group) 69% 31%
PC (Stand-alone) 85% 15%
As suggested by the full life-cycle cost distribution in Figure 14, distributed
environments sometimes come with hidden price tags. The Gartner Group categorizes
many of these hidden elements as management and control functions such as availability,
performance, backup and recovery, security, system management, network management,
disaster recovery, capacity planning, and change management [Ref. 41 :p. 8]. It may be the
case that there is no need for some of these requirements, and thus, the hidden overhead
may not be as damaging. If, however, these hidden costs do represent essential functions of
an organization's infrastructure and they are not adequately addressed in the cost estimates,
a distorted picture of the true costs can result (Figure 15).
3. Intangible Benefits
Intangible benefits refer to those attributes of desktop systems that may be ex-
tremely beneficial, but hard to express in monetary terms. In fact, in the long run, these ben-
efits may be a more significant driver in fueling the downsizing trend than the perception
of cost savings. While corporate end-users are becoming accustomed to the new desktop
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control and ease-of-use of these new desktop tools, corporate officials increasingly realize
the strategic necessity of greater technological flexibility and responsiveness to change.
Yet how does one measure the benefits or costs of attributes like desktop control, techno-
logical flexibility, and greater responsiveness to new business requirements? Undeniably,
these factors are perceived to be critical to many organizations—but how critical, and what
is it worth? The fact remains that measuring any increase or decrease in productivity as a
result of these intangible benefits is a very difficult task.
Some believe that downsizing is a revolutionary process that cannot be cost-jus-
tified with traditional IS cost-estimating procedures. They argue that "traditional IS costing
methods are based on the rules of a bygone era in which mass production manufacturing
served as the model for cost justification" and that applying old methodologies to try to
cost-justify downsizing is simply inappropriate [Ref. 42]. Others agree that downsizing is
a revolutionary process, but that a cost/benefit analysis becomes that much more significant
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because of the importance of the intangible and unquantifiable costs and benefits. Accord-
ing to the Gartner Group:
Downsizing is often viewed as a process that stems naturally from hardware becom-
ing smaller, less expensive, and easier to maintain. In reality, downsizing is part of
a technology restructuring that formalizes a fundamental shift of ownership of IT as-
sets. Decisions require a fully burdened life-cycle cost analysis, especially because
a substantial amount of spending occurs through end-user activities that are not part
of the formal IS budget. [Ref. 38:p. 6]
Undoubtedly, cost-justifying downsizing is an extremely complex process that
may require non-traditional methods. And certainly, the qualitative and largely unquantifi-
able factors should be weighted equally with discrete and quantitative ones. Given the lim-
ited scope of this thesis and the almost unwieldy task of a complete cost-justification, this
chapter will not attempt to outline specific techniques of full-blown cost-justification
—
which would inevitably require weighting the indirect benefits and incorporating them with
those features that are directly measurable.
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V. FRAMING THE DOWNSIZING ISSUES FOR DOD AND ONI
Much of the focus of this thesis so far has been on providing a corporate perspective
of downsizing issues. Earlier references to business needs and processes, organizational
support, and cost savings have frequently been mentioned in the context of the civilian
agencies competing in the private market. Despite the focus on the corporate world, draw-
ing boundaries between DoD organizations and the private sector to isolate differences is
largely unnecessary. DoD organizations are unique in many respects, but for the most part
IT trends mirror those of its corporate counterparts.
This chapter will attempt to "frame" and summarize the key downsizing issues for
DoD organizations such as the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). This will include an out-
line of the DoD policies and federal initiatives that have created a virtual mandate to down-
size—and how DoD organizations are responding to that mandate. The last part of this
chapter will highlight key issues for ONI by encapsulating "corporate lessons learned."
This portion will summarize the thesis, hopefully giving top managers general guidelines
with which they can intelligently plan a downsizing strategy and make key decisions.
A. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) MANDATE
DoD and ONI are in the process of responding to the same business pressures shared
by private industry. Customers are demanding better service. Budgets are declining. Sub-
sequent pressures to "do more with less" and "work smarter, not harder" are forcing orga-
nizations to re-think the way they do business. The most common response to this
challenge, both in the corporate world and government, has been to use IT to reengineer
and redefine business processes and achieve greater efficiencies with tremendous cost
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savings. Where does the trend of downsizing information systems fit into this picture? The
downsizing trend is a manifestation of efforts to implement this vision.
The federal government and DoD, responding to pressures to utilize IT more ef-
ficiently, have begun a series of initiatives to fight the complexity and costs of computing
and streamline government-wide information processing.
1. Corporate Information Management Program
One of the most visible initiatives of DoD in recent years has been the Corporate
Information Management (CIM) program. CIM seeks to help DoD managers and military
commanders make best use of their information by calling for the restructuring and realign-
ment of the entire information infrastructure of the Department of Defense.
The objectives of CIM sound remarkably similar to those of the business reengi-
neering and the total quality movement (Chapter IV). CIM's goal is to optimize business
processes by identifying business improvement opportunities, promoting a common under-
standing of business rules across departments, and then designing systems to support the
way business is done. To complement and support these goals, CIM strongly advocates
standardization, interoperability, shared data, reusable software, and modular applications.
Examples of implementations of CIM concepts include attempts to consolidate some of
DoD data centers; one phase included consolidation of 428 data centers into 52 mega-
centers. A more recent CIM initiative has been for DoD to consolidate 21,000 of its legacy
applications into about 547 interim systems by 1999. The payoff for such bold initiatives
include significant cost reductions because of fewer systems, less maintenance, shorter de-
velopment times, and lower development costs. According to Paul Strassman, former di-
rector of Defense Information and a leading advocate of the CEM program:
The savings are everywhere, because savings are [achieved], by and large, by doing
business process redesign... We have a formal process for looking at business pro-
cesses—who says what to whom, who passes paper to whom—and then doing value
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analysis. And [we have found] whole functions which have grown over 30 years
which are not necessary anymore. [Ref. 43:p. 107]
Though CIM efforts such as data consolidation hint of centralized processing,
Strassman is very much a believer in distributed architectures:
You must also understand that we also believe in client/server. While we are consol-
idating the main files, at the same time we're... decentralizing application processing
into a client/server environment. [Ref. 43:p. 108]
2. Defense Management Review Directive (DMRD) 918
To support the concepts defined by CIM, in early 1993 DoD issued a Defense
Management Review Decision (DMRD) 918 that mandates DISA to design, develop,
maintain, and support a Defense Information Infrastructure (DO) that will help DoD create
a multi-service, seamless, end-to-end network based on an open system, multi-level secu-
rity, client/server environment. According to the director of the Pentagon's Center for In-
formation management, the ideal DEI will create an "infosphere" that will be capable of
providing military personnel with integrated services for voice, data, and video from a sin-
gle terminal. Paul Strassman says DII is to DoD as the skeleton is to the body—DII will
essentially serve as the backbone on which the defense databases, the CEM technical refer-
ence model, the data dictionary, and systems will hang. [Ref. 44:p. 3]
The DMRD 918 strategy for streamlining the DoD information infrastructure
does not rely on merely building a conceptual framework. For example, besides working
towards creating a service-wide information infrastructure, DMRD 918 also seeks to align
automatic data processing (ADP) efforts through consolidation of many of independent and
service-specific functions at DISA. These changes are being coordinated by new DISA di-
rector, Lt. Gen. Alonzo Short Jr., who believes "[c]hange is not going to stop. IT applica-
tions must be the directing force as you set to add value to your products and services...
There has to be a transition from high volume to high value" [Ref. 45:p. 15]. As originally
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estimated, this new realigned infrastructure has projected savings of $4.5 billion across all
the services for the period from 1993 to 1999.
3. National Performance Review (NPR)
In releasing the report of the National Performance Review (NPR) in September
1993, Vice President Gore helps to validate ongoing DoD efforts to do more with less by
streamlining IS processes, reducing redundancy, and encouraging interoperability. Entitled
From Red Tape to Results, Creating a Government that Works Better & Costs Less, the
NPR issues a clarion call for using IT to reengineer business processes and obtain radical
improvements in government efficiency:
Washington's attempts to integrate information technology into the business of gov-
ernment have produced some successes but many costly failures. Many federal ex-
ecutives continue to overlook information technology's strategic role in
reengineering agency practices. Agency information resource management plans
aren't integrated, and their managers often aren't brought into the top realm of agen-
cy decision-making. Modernization programs tend to degenerate into loose collec-
tions of independent systems solving unique problems. Or they simply automate,
instead of improve, how we do business. [Ref. 46]
The report suggests extensive use of IT to create a government that works better
and costs less:
With computers and telecommunications, we need not do things as we have in the
past. We can design a customer-driven electronic government that operates in ways
that, 10 years ago, the most visionary planner could not have imagined... [Ref. 46]
As everyone knows, the computer revolution allows us to do things faster and more
cheaply than we ever have before. Savings due to consolidation and modernization
of the information infrastructure amount to $5.4 billion over 5 years. [Ref. 46]
B. RESPONDING TO THE MANDATE
Undoubtedly, the federal initiatives that are in place are a clear edict for the use of IT
to "reinvent" government and make it do more for less money. Though the problems of
government are well identified and the vision of the future is clear, the procedures for
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achieving these objectives are vague. Promises of a "customer-driven electronic govern-
ment" and DoD "infospheres" all too often paint a rosy future without adequate discussion
of procedural implementation.
Ultimately however, in terms of IT, the implications of these federal initiatives are
much the same as in the corporate world. One of the inevitable responses to the mandate is
to "downsize" or "rightsize" organizations, taking advantage of new and faster technolo-
gies and more flexible architectures such as client/server.
Viewed somewhat as a panacea to government ineffectiveness and inefficiency, the
downsizing of information systems is already a pervasive federal trend—not necessarily in
response to the federal directives. DoD and other federal agencies are off-loading their ap-
plications from the mainframes to distributed computing environments at much the same
pace of the civilian sector. Of all federal IT executives surveyed in a 1993 downsizing
study, 84 percent of them revealed that their organizations planned to migrate to a client/
server architecture [Ref. 47:p. 16]. Such responses support other studies of declining fed-
eral mainframe usage and estimates of a continuing exodus towards desktop computing.
Findings from one study regarding mainframe usage are illustrated in Figure 16.
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C. HIGHLIGHTING CORPORATE "LESSONS LEARNED"
In light of the exodus to smaller systems and open, distributed architectures such as
client/server, downsizing of IS is too often perceived as the "easy answer" to federal prob-
lems. As the corporate world has discovered, however, while downsizing can resolve some
issues, it also has the potential of opening up a Pandora's Box if done based on faulty or-
ganizational, technical, and cost assumptions.
At a June 1993 symposium on Rightsizing in the Federal Government, keynote
speaker Congressman Charlie Rose (D-N.C.) warned that the growth of the distributed
environment could lead to administrative nightmares for agencies. Rose said that the com-
bination of powerful desktop systems armed with rudimentary programming knowledge
could create "the new anarchy of the masses in computing." He also cautioned the audience
about the functions they might be inadvertently abandoning in a downsized environment,
pointing out the mainframe strengths in the area of systems and network management and
security. Concerned about this possible lack of control, Rose stated that "multiple forms of
bad data" and problems with viruses "could be the legacy of the new structure." As a final
note, he advised "Let's not throw out all of the lessons we learned from the mainframe era."
[Ref. 47:p. 16&20]
Thus, as ONI and other DoD agencies try to respond to pressures to "do more with
less" and examine the option of downsizing information systems from a mainframe envi-
ronment to distributed architectures such as client/server, strong consideration needs to be
given to several key issues that have been covered in this thesis. The following paragraphs
use key findings of this thesis to summarize important considerations when downsizing.
1. Organizational Considerations
• Recognize organizational implications of distributed computing before downsiz-
ing. Distribution of computing resources may be inherently more suitable in some
organizations than others depending on organizational operations and enterprise-
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wide interdependencies.Although technical considerations are critical, they should
not be the prime force behind a system architecture.Additionally, end-users should
be given special consideration and a voice in the distribution and utilization of
computing resources.
Understanding of business needs is critical. IT can only be a strategic asset to the
degree that it supports the corporate strategy. For downsizing to work, planning ef-
forts must ensure that the downsized product is relevant to the business needs.
Analysis of critical success factors in strategic IS planning may serve as an essen-
tial first step.
Optimize business processes before automation. All aspects of a system must be
broken down to their individual components to the point where all linkages, inter-
dependencies, and relationships between parts are clearly understood. All ineffi-
ciencies in the system should be removed, allowing only the processes that add
value to remain. Streamlining and possible automation of these remaining process-
es ensures maximum efficiency and productivity.
Top management support is a prerequisite. Before proceeding too quickly with
any downsizing plans, it is an absolute necessity to ensure that top corporate offi-
cials have "bought off on the idea. Downsizing is as much a political issue as a
technical issue. Commitment is crucial in light of a potentially difficult migration
process full of volatile cultural and social upheaval.
Resistance to change should be anticipated and managed. Downsizing will require
change—and inevitably, change will provoke resistance. Unless proactive steps
are taken to counter potentially negative reactions, the forces of resistance can
work to undermine any downsizing initiatives. Thus, the CIO and CEO must ac-
knowledge these predictable responses and work in concert to match each, in turn,
with a countermeasure.
Some centralized direction is essential. Considerable centralized direction from
top IS management is critical to guide the downsizing process; this is particularly
true with respect to the IS infrastructure.
2. Architectural and Technical Considerations
Client/server architecture promises the mostflexibility. In the client/server model,
a network composed of mainframes (to include mid-range computers) and power-
ful desktop computers can all play critical roles. The varying degrees of client/
server different models and "shades" of client/server computing allow data presen-
tation, application location, and data management to be hosted on the most appro-
priate platform. Performance can be optimized by the shifting and redeployment
of data resources and computing power according to task requirements and system
strengths.
Heterogeneous client/server architectures also promise complexity. The
inevitable by-product of technological flexibility has been complexity. The trend
has moved computing from an era of manageable, homogeneous computing on
monolithic systems to an era of unmanageable, heterogeneous, networked systems
creating an architectural crisis of sorts.
The mainframe can play critical roles in a client/server environment. Many IS ex-
perts believe that the mainframe's role will evolve this decade in new ways that are
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synergistic with the boom in distributed computing. New technologies can supple-
ment rather than displace older ones with the mainframe being particularly well-
suited as an enterprise hub in the areas of data management and networking
management.
Open systems remain to be one of the biggest challenges. Building a comprehen-
sive and absolute set of standards that will allow construction of integrated systems
and will allow interoperability of systems and portability of applications is unreal-
istic. Gartner Group predicts a coexistence of multiple standards with interopera-
bility between them.
The role of middleware is inextricably linked to open systems. Middleware, with
its goal of transparent software services, will continue to be a critical component
in reaching any virtually homogeneous architecture.
Rapid Application Development tools (RAD) can significantly increase productiv-
ity. RAD tools such as 4GLs can offer significant benefits to increase application
development productivity. Though some believe that 4GL's are too proprietary, do
not permit portability, and are unsuitable for complex programs requiring intricate
data handling, some 4GL tools have proven otherwise.
Selecting an appropriate downsizing candidate is crucial to project success. Many
IS personnel use heuristics such as high maintenance costs and low mission-criti-
cality to guide their decisions. Other factors such as the actual structure of the
code, however, can significantly affect downsizing feasibility as well.
Migration strategy is as important as the downsizing decision itself. Organizations
need to decide to either ( 1 ) grow with their traditional mainframes, (2) fade out the
mainframe while preparing replacement systems, or (3) kill the mainframe as
quickly as possible—commitment to a global strategy should help guide other de-
cisions.
Downsizing can mean trading systems maturity and integrated services of larger
systemsforflexibility, openness, and unintegrated services ofdistributed systems.
Despite their proprietary nature and expense, many corporations are unwilling to
move mission-critical systems to an unproven, immature desktop environment.
The services provided by mainframe systems management tools are perceived to
be more developed and tested than in a client/server environment.
Security issues should not be an afterthought. Neglecting such important issues as
security and integrity can result in serious loopholes in the information system.
Despite rapid advances, the perception is that mainframe-strength security systems
are simply not as available—or as robust—in a distributed environment
Throughput capabilities remain a major strength of the mainframe. The main-
frame has been optimized to support high volume and intricate data management
with its enormous bandwidth and the ability to manage multiple complex tasks.
The most advanced and developed desktop systems are just beginning to compete
with the mainframe in this area.
3. Cost Considerations
Cost/benefit analysis must include conversion costs and costs ofoperating in new
environment. Often the costs associated with conversion are overshadowed by
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promises of cost savings in a new environment. Up-front conversion costs to dis-
tributed systems can represent a sizable investment.
Conversion costs will vary tremendously depending on the candidate application
for downsizing and the migration strategy. If the corporate migration strategy is to
"kill" the mainframe and to off-load all applications, the conversion costs may be
dramatically higher than with a "surround and integrate" strategy.
Costs ofoperating in a distributed environment are often grossly underestimated.
Focus on the desktop capital-related hardware and software costs to the exclusion
of personnel and systems management costs can result in a distorted cost analysis.
Contrasting costs of mainframes to desktop systems in terms ofprice-to-perfor-
mance rations can be a very misleading comparison. The processing power does
not take into account the true meaning of MIPS, nor does it account for a myriad
of the other technical and non-technical issues that comprise a significant share of
an IS budget.
In terms of costs, mainframes tend to be capital intensive; desktop systems tend to
be labor intensive. Gartner Group estimates that the capital-related costs of the av-
erage five-year life cycle of an average PC in a corporate environment accounts for
only 15% of the total costs; the other 85% percent of the costs are personnel costs,
related to administrative and technical support as well as end-user operations.
Cost-justifying downsizing is an extremely complex process that may require non-
traditional methodologies. Because many intangible factors such as "ease-of use"
and flexibility can yield significant benefits, the qualitative and largely unquanti-




This thesis has been written for middle and top managers at ONI and has sought to
provide an executive-level summary of the issues involved in downsizing information sys-
tems. Downsizing of information systems is an extremely complex process that requires an
understanding of a wide variety of managerial and technical issues. Baffling terminology,
biased vendor assistance, and rapidly changing technology complicate already difficult de-
cisions. This paper was conceived and written with the intention of assisting decision-mak-
ers by untangling and outlining some of those key and pertinent issues.
The traditional component that has dominated the centralized corporate IS architec-
tures over the past 20 years has been the mainframe. With the advent of the personal com-
puters and their rapidly improving capabilities, a paradigm shift has occurred that has
enabled the desktop computers to evolve into a critically important role in current-genera-
tion IS architectures. This paradigm shift to smaller systems—downsizing—has led to a
migration of IS functions off the centralized mainframe to an environment of distributed
computing. Organizations and users perceive many of the desktop advantages such as cost
savings, flexibility, and desktop control to be among other factors that make desktop com-
puting a strategic necessity.
One architecture that is taking center stage as part of corporate IS is the client/server
model. Within this architecture, the degree to which functions are shifted from a central
computer (the server) to a desktop machine (client) varies greatly among applications. The
mainframe is likely to remain an important component within this new computing para-
digm. For some organizations, the mainframe is needed to perform in new capacities as an
enterprise hub—both as a data server and systems manager. Because the sophistication of
computing tools has advanced in parallel with new computing concepts, the capabilities of
architectural tools are also fueling the downsizing movement in some cases. Though con-
temporary desktop tools can offer much promise, they may not necessarily be mature
enough for sophisticated applications. The choice of migration strategies—for selecting the
best application to downsize and transitioning to the new architecture—is one of the critical
issues facing IS management.
The heart of this thesis is the risk assessment in the fourth chapter. The risks associ-
ated with downsizing were categorized according to organizational, technical, and econom-
ic factors. This chapter looked at some organizational prerequisites for downsizing
including the need for understanding business needs, processes, and generating organiza-
tional support. An assessment of the technical factors revealed the need for some inevitable
trade-offs when moving from mainframes to desktop systems. The cost/benefit analysis
section helped to highlight some of the often hidden costs of distributed computing.
The fifth chapter "framed" the downsizing issues for DoD and ONI. Specifically,
DoD and federal IT initiatives were outlined with the intention of showing how various
programs are pressuring DoD for greater efficiency and effectiveness through IS—in effect,
creating a "virtual mandate" to downsize to distributed environments. The final part of this
chapter outlined the key corporate "lessons learned" and findings that decision-makers may
use as a checklist to review the appropriateness of downsizing decisions.
What this thesis did not do was provide an in-depth case study relating many of these
issues to an actual organization's downsizing experiences. As research progressed on this
thesis, it became increasingly obvious that to do so would be at the expense of critical anal-
ysis of many of the core concepts. A follow-on thesis that uses the findings of this thesis as
a basis for analysis of a downsizing project is recommended.
Again, the goal of this paper was to provide a "state of the art" report and risk assess-
ment factors associated with, and affecting, the key decision to "downsize" information
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systems. Because there is neither a structured methodology nor "one right way" to down-
size, the downsizing process can be unstructured and unwieldy. Hopefully, this broad sur-
vey has enabled decision-makers to better understand the implications of this trend by
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